Turkey and European security institutions by Scheer, Aaron M.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection
2009-03
Turkey and European security institutions
Scheer, Aaron M.













Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 








 Thesis Advisor:  Donald Abenheim 
 Second Reader: Richard Hoffman 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 i
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188 
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, 
searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send 
comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to 
Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 
22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington DC 20503. 
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) 
 
2. REPORT DATE  
March 2009 
3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED 
Master’s Thesis 
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Turkey and European Security Institutions 
6. AUTHOR(S) Aaron M. Scheer 
5. FUNDING NUMBERS 
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA 93943-5000 
8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION 
REPORT NUMBER  
9. SPONSORING /MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
N/A 
10. SPONSORING/MONITORING 
 AGENCY REPORT NUMBER 
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy 
or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. 
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT  
Approved of public release; distribution is unlimited 
12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE 
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)  
Turkey’s relationships with the West, particularly its relationship with Western security institutions, are 
today more important than ever. As the United States fights two wars in the region and attempts to rebuild its 
reputation in Europe and the Middle East, Turkey is once again central to America’s plans. Yet, this crucial ally is 
little understood by U.S. policy makers. Turkey has a long relationship with Euro-Atlantic security institutions, 
specifically NATO and the various European institutions, culminating in today’s European Security and Defense 
Policy (ESDP).  
The following study poses the following questions of relevance to those interested in theory and policy. Why 
do the government and people of Turkey participate in these institutions? What long-term policy objectives do makers 
of policy in Turkey wish to advance through its participation in these institutions? What are the different ways that 
Turkey leverages its participation to advance its goals? Specifically, how does Turkey use its participation in 
European security institutions to advance its positions on issues such as European Union membership, defense 
modernization, and its ongoing internal and external areas of conflict? How does Turkey’s Ottoman legacy affect 
these relationships and how has this historical background shaped today’s events? 
This thesis also sets out to answer whether Turkey is successful in its participation; in other words, does its 
participation allow Turkey to advance its goals better? How do current trends in Europe affect Turkey’s participation 
in these institutions?  
 
15. NUMBER OF 
PAGES  
81 
14. SUBJECT TERMS Turkey, NATO, ESDP, Partnership for Peace, European Integration, 
European Union. 

















NSN 7540-01-280-5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89)  
 Prescribed by ANSI Std. 239-18 
 ii
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 iii
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
 
 
TURKEY AND EUROPEAN SECURITY INSTITUTIONS 
 
Aaron M. Scheer 
Major, United States Air Force 
B.A., Binghamton University, 1995 
 
 
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of 
 
 


























Dr. Harold A. Trinkunas, PhD 
Chairman, Department of National Security Affairs 
 iv
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 v
ABSTRACT 
Turkey’s relationships with the West, particularly its relationship with Western 
security institutions, are today more important than ever. As the United States fights two 
wars in the region and attempts to rebuild its reputation in Europe and the Middle East, 
Turkey is once again central to America’s plans. Yet, this crucial ally is little understood 
by U.S. policy makers. Turkey has a long relationship with Euro-Atlantic security 
institutions, specifically NATO and the various European institutions, culminating in 
today’s European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP).  
The following study poses the following questions of relevance to those interested 
in theory and policy. Why do the government and people of Turkey participate in these 
institutions? What long-term policy objectives do makers of policy in Turkey wish to 
advance through its participation in these institutions? What are the different ways that 
Turkey leverages its participation to advance its goals? Specifically, how does Turkey 
use its participation in European security institutions to advance its positions on issues 
such as European Union membership, defense modernization, and its ongoing internal 
and external areas of conflict? How does Turkey’s Ottoman legacy affect these 
relationships and how has this historical background shaped today’s events? 
This thesis also sets out to answer whether Turkey is successful in its 
participation; in other words, does its participation allow Turkey to advance its goals 
better? How do current trends in Europe affect Turkey’s participation in these 
institutions?  
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Turkey’s relationships with the West, particularly its relationship with Western 
security institutions, are today more important than ever. As the United States fights two 
wars in the region and attempts to rebuild its reputation in Europe and the Middle East, 
Turkey is once again central to America’s plans. Yet, this crucial ally is little understood 
by U.S. policy makers. Turkey has a long relationship with Euro-Atlantic security 
institutions, specifically NATO and the precursors to the European Security and Defense 
Policy (ESDP). With the rise of the EU and Turkey’s painstaking attempts to integrate 
with Europe, this relationship grew to include the ESDP. Turkey joined NATO together 
with Greece in 1952 and served as its southern flank against the Soviet Union throughout 
the Cold War. The transformation of the map of Europe only increased the importance of 
Turkey in the world that has dawned. It continued its relationship with NATO after the 
Cold War and throughout NATO’s transformation of the 1990s from Cold War defense 
to regional peace and stability force. Despite not being a member of the EU, Turkey is an 
active participant in EU security operations and deployments. 
The following study poses the following questions of relevance to those interested 
in theory and policy. Why do the government and people of Turkey participate in these 
institutions? What long-term policy objectives do makers of policy in Turkey wish to 
advance through its participation in these institutions? What are the different ways that 
Turkey leverages its participation to advance its goals? Specifically, how does Turkey 
use its participation in European security institutions to advance its positions on issues 
such as European Union membership, defense modernization, the Cyprus question, the 
Armenian tragedy of 1915, and the Kurdish question? Is Turkey successful in its 
participation; in other words, does its involvement allow Turkey to better advance its 
goals? How do current trends in Europe affect Turkey’s partaking in these institutions? 
For example, how does the Euro-Atlantic relationship, including the differences over 
Iraq, affect Turkey’s alignment? How do Turkey’s internal politics affect Turkey’s stated 
desire for European integration? How has the Turkish-American security relationship  
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weathered recent setbacks such as the 2003 Iraq War, the ongoing Kurdish insurgency, 
and the proposed resolutions in the United States Congress to recognize the Armenian 
Tragedy of 1915 as genocide? 
A. IMPORTANCE  
Turkey’s importance to U.S. strategic interests cannot be overstated. One need 
only look at Turkey’s refusal to allow a Northern invasion route through Turkey during 
Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. Turkey’s refusal to allow American troops to assault from 
the north forced an entire reworking of the invasion. According to former Secretary of 
Defense Donald Rumsfeld, this was the source of much of the post-conflict chaos and 
difficulty in Iraq. A better understanding of Turkey by American decision makers at that 
key decision point would have led to a better outcome and perhaps improved the strategic 
picture in Iraq. A better understanding of Turkey can certainly improve future outcomes 
for United States diplomacy.  
Why is Turkey important to the United States and the DoD is a question that 
reveals more about the person who asks it than about the actual state of war and peace at 
the crossroads of Europe and Asia. Turkey is a nation, which many Americans have 
simply taken for granted as an ally, and which now demands its tribute in terms of 
analytical energy and some degree of effort to understand the world as seen by Turks 
themselves. Turkey fields the second largest military within NATO and the largest in 
Europe. Turkey boasts a highly strategic location, astride Europe, the Caucasus, the 
Middle East, and the Mediterranean. For the United States and specifically the DoD, 
Turkey is critical both for its location and its military capabilities, but the nation is 
anything other than the pliant locale of U.S. bases as in the glory years of the 1960s. 
Currently, Turkey hosts the American military’s Iraq Cargo Hub at Incirlik Air Base, 
responsible for the majority of all air delivered cargo in support of Operation IRAQI 
FREEDOM. In addition to Incirlik, Turkey hosts Izmir Air Base, which provides 
logistical support to NATO Headquarters Izmir, a command led by an American 3-star 
General. The city of Eskisehir is also home to a NATO Combined Air Operations Center. 
Konya Range hosts joint air operations exercises that in the past included the air forces of 
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the United States, Turkey, and Israel. While much lower than its Cold War footprint, 
Ankara is the home of Balgat Air Base that provides support to the American Embassy 
and the Office of Defense Cooperation. Finally, there is an embedded presence at the 
NATO Rapid Deployment Cell in Istanbul. Additionally, Turkey allows the use of its 
airspace and bases for the U.S. air bridge in support of Operation ENDURING 
FREEDOM. 
Turkey’s history of cooperation with the United States stretches back to the 
Korean War, when Turkey sent troops in support of the United Nations defense of South 
Korea. As a Muslim country, Turkey’s cooperation with the United States in security 
operations provides needed legitimacy in the Balkans and Afghanistan. As former 
Ambassador Lake noted, Turkey’s participation removes the stigma of a “Clash of 
Civilizations.” Importantly, in the early days of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, 
some Muslims attempted to pressure the United States to halt its campaign against the 
Taliban during the month of Ramadan. Turkey supported the United States decision not 
to halt the campaign, thus providing needed diplomatic support for this move.1 During 
these early days of the Global War on Terror, Turkey’s Prime Minister Ecevit provided 
diplomatic support concerning the issue of “proof” that Osama Bin Laden and Al-Qaeda 
perpetrated the atrocities of September 11th. At the time, parts of the Middle East and the 
Muslim world demanded proof of Bin-Laden’s guilt before deciding whether to support 
Operation ENDURING FREEDOM. Yet, Prime Minister Ecevit dismissed this argument, 
stating “The fact that the United States found this evidence against Bin Laden persuasive, 
persuades us also.”2 Again, Turkey stepped up to protect America’s flank against those 
who sought to retard America’s war on terror through legalistic means. 
 
 
                                                 
1 Tom Lansford, All for One: Terrorism, NATO and the United States (Burlington, VT: Ashgate. 
2002), 123. 
2 Feroz Ahmad, Turkey: The Quest for Identity (Oxford: Oneworld, 2003), 179. 
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In addition, Turkey is a key player in other important security issues, to include 
Iraq, the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process, the current standoff with Iran, and the recent 
crisis in the Caucasus. Turkey’s participation in European security institutions is 
important because the outcome of this participation affects the United States’ interests in 
all of the aforementioned issues.  
When looking at modern Turkey and the problems it faces, one must remember 
that Turkey is the heir of the Ottoman Empire. Turkey, particularly the secular (to include 
the military) establishment, attributes the destruction of the Empire to the perceived role 
of forces both outside and inside the Empire. Turkey does in fact live in a “rough 
neighborhood.” Although relations today are considerably warmer, Turkey and Greece 
lived for years in a state of near war. Turkey invaded Cyprus in 1974 to prevent Cyprus’s 
unification with Greece. Thirty years later, Turkish troops are still in Northern Cyprus 
(Turkey is the only nation to recognize the sovereignty of the Turkish Republic of North 
Cyprus). Additionally, throughout the Cold War, Turkey and its neighbor Bulgaria found 
themselves on opposite sides of the conflict. The relationship reached a low point 20 
years ago when Bulgaria expelled much of its ethnic Turkish population, forcing the 
refugees into Turkey. To the east, Turkey shares a border with Armenia. Turkey froze 
this shared border in solidarity with Azerbaijan during the Nagorno-Karabakh war of the 
early 1990s. Turkey and its southern neighbor Syria almost went to war in the late 1990s 
over Syria’s support of the PKK. Syria only recently renounced its claim to Turkey’s 
Hatay province, and argued frequently in the past with Turkey over water rights. The 
situation in Iraq needs little introduction. Internally, Turkey continues to fight an 
insurgency in its southeast with the terrorist PKK. The bottom line is that Turkey exists in 
a dangerous part of the world and has multiple conflicts, both frozen and unfrozen, with 
which to contend. Bearing in mind these challenges, it is clear that Turkey has many very 
good reasons to seek a place in European security institutions. These institutions, both 
NATO and the ESDP, can provide tools necessary for Turkey to deal better with the 
many strategic challenges it faces. Perhaps the greatest of these objectives is European 
integration. Turkey uses its participation in NATO and ESDP to further its goals of 
European integration. Turkey’s long-term goal is to become a member of the European 
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Union, and it sees participation in NATO and ESDP as furthering this goal. By showing 
its usefulness and indispensability in real world operations, Turkey seeks to influence 
Europe toward approving its candidacy for European integration. 
Additionally, Turkey uses the leverage inherent in security institution membership 
to extract advantages and benefits from its partners in these institutions. For example, 
Turkey uses its partnership in NATO to strengthen its political/military ties with the 
United States. Turkey’s military is becoming increasingly technology-based, and 
Turkey’s partnership in NATO gains Turkey access to American defense markets. For 
example, Incirlik Air Base is the home of not only America’s largest military presence in 
the country but also the Turkish Air Force’s 10th Tanker Wing. This wing flies American-
supplied KC-135s, giving Turkey in-flight refueling capability. Turkey’s Air Force also 
flies the American F-16 (with a licensed production line in Turkey itself). Turkey sees a 
strong relationship with the United States as furthering its national interests (although 
some parties in Turkey do not share this view which will also be discussed in this thesis).  
Turkey also seeks to influence its neighbors in the Caucasus and Central Asia 
through its participation in NATO’s “Partnership for Peace” Program. Yet, Turkey also 
faces such specific problems with its neighbors as ongoing territorial disputes with its 
neighbors Armenia and Cyprus. In terms of the Armenian dispute, Turkey seeks to 
mitigate this dispute through its participation in European security institutions. By 
leveraging its approval of Armenian participation and direct interaction through these 
security operations, Turkey hopes to improve its relations with Armenia, and in turn, 
neutralize one of the key international issues facing Turkey: the attempts by the 
Armenian Diaspora to recognize the Armenian Tragedy of World War I as genocide as a 
means to stigmatize Turkey in the European system of states as an outsider, and for some, 
a chance to threaten the territorial integrity of Turkey through the forced cessation of 
land. 
The Cyprus dispute is perhaps the single greatest inhibitor to Turkey’s goals it 
wishes to achieve through its participation in European security institutions. Turkey 
invaded Cyprus in 1974 in response to a coup by forces seeking unification with Greece. 
Turkish troops still occupy Northern Cyprus, and Turkey is the only nation in the world 
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that recognizes the Turkish Republic of North Cyprus. The situation is further 
complicated by the post-1974 settlement of tens of thousands of Turks from the mainland 
in Northern Cyprus. Cyprus is now in the European Union, but not in NATO, while 
Turkey is in NATO but not in the European Union. This conflicted situation led to a tit 
for tat scenario between Cyprus and Turkey following Cyprus’s recent EU accession, and 
is perhaps the greatest impediment to Turkey’s key national aspiration of European 
integration. The following analysis will seek to underline the implications of this and 
allied issues for the makers of U.S. policy and strategy.  
B. LITERATURE REVIEW 
For an introductory background on Turkey’s European, Middle Eastern and 
Islamic identities, the author chose several books, including William Cleveland’s A 
History of the Modern Middle East. This work describes Turkey’s Ottoman predecessor, 
the Ottoman Empire’s expansion, contraction and eventual destruction. Similarly, the 
author also chose Bernard Lewis’s The Middle East: A Brief History of the Last 2,000 
Years. Lewis interprets the Ottoman Empire and its role in the international system prior 
to its disappearance. In particular, he explains the interaction between the Ottomans and 
Europe and how the balance of power shifted away from the Ottomans in favor of the 
West between the 17th and 20th centuries. Lewis’s book is of particular use in framing the 
development of multicultural identities in the late Ottoman Empire, both for the 
minorities of the empire and for the Turks themselves. This particular concept becomes 
important when looking at modern Turkey’s secular establishment’s belief in a variant of 
the “stab in the back” theory. Much like inter-war Germany and post-Vietnam America, 
the Turkish establishment has its own villains to blame for its loss in World War I: 
treacherous minorities within the empire, in collusion with the Western Allies, worked to 
destroy the empire from within. 
Yavuz Hakan’s work, Islamic Political Identity in Turkey, is of special 
importance for two reasons. First, Hakan describes the rise of Islamic-oriented political 
parties in Turkey and the threat they pose to the secular Kemalist establishment. 
Secondly, this work covers Turkey and Europe’s disagreements over human rights and 
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the Kurdish question. This book frames one of the key ideas of this thesis: that the 
traditional narrative of Turkish secularists as the West’s natural allies and Turkish 
Islamists as the West’s opponents represents too simplistic a view of a complex reality. 
Today, the world faces an Islamist government in Ankara that favors European 
integration and a secular establishment that is increasingly suspicious of the United 
States, Europe, and the West. This thesis will examine this proposition in depth.  
Another work providing critical information on Turkey’s relationship with Europe 
is Turkey: Terrorism, Civil Rights, and the European Union by Yonah Alexander. The 
work is most valuable for its contributions of historical documents relevant to the thesis. 
The author provides transcripts of the original Turkish parliamentarian legislation for its 
anti-terror laws, and civil rights reform. Conversely, it also includes pertinent legislation 
concerning Turkey’s European accession and the demands that Europe placed upon 
Turkey. 
NATO Transformed by David Yost explains the transformation of NATO in the 
1990s from Cold War alliance to a regional security organization seeking to export 
democratic values through peacekeeping operations and diplomatic outreach. The book 
also details Turkey’s specific contributions to the NATO operations of the 1990s. Just as 
Yost’s book provides insight into NATO and Turkey’s role, Jolyon Holworth’s work 
Security and Defense Policy in the European Union helpfully describes the role and 
organizational composition of the ESDP and its predecessors. In addition, it also 
describes Turkey’s participation in specific European Union-led real world security 
operations. Finally, Holworth’s work chronicles Turkey and the European Union’s clash 
over Cyprus in terms of the NATO-ESDP overlap: the tit for tat between Turkey and 
Cyprus that continues to hamper NATO-ESDP cooperation. 
Bulent Ali Riza, of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, provides 
further insight into the current state of Turkey’s relationship with both Europe and the 
United States in his Turkey Update of 2008. His work is particularly helpful in explaining 




affect the Turkish-American relationship. The work chronicles the recovery of the 
Turkish-American relationship following the low point of 2003, an especially helpful 
aspect.  
Frank Schimmelfennig’s Costs, Commitment and Compliance: The Impact of EU 
Democratic Conditionality on Latvia, Slovakia, and Turkey details the Turkish Kemalist 
establishment with Europe on the Kurdish question, multi culturism, and human rights. It 
frames the disagreements in the context of Turkey’s progress in European integration. It 
also explains Turkey’s suspicion of European motives for pushing the above issues 
(again, the “stab in the back” theory”).  
Just as Schimmelfennig covers Turkey’s attempts at European accession, so too 
does Kirsty Hughes in her working paper “Turkey and the European Union: Just another 
Enlargement?.” Hughes’s work, for the Friends of Europe Foundation, details the 
economic and demographic drivers of Turkish integration to include the financial 
packages offered to recent additions to the EU, Bulgaria and Romania. In addition, the 
author outlines possible ramifications to EU foreign policy of Turkish accession for such 
issues as the Black Sea basin, the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict, as well as the Turkic 
republics of Central Asia. 
Omer Taspinar, director of the Turkey program at the Brookings Institution, 
published an extremely revealing position paper for the Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace. Turkey’s Middle East Policies, between Neo-Ottomanism and 
Kemalism reveals an important cleavage in modern Turkey, that of the Kemalists and 
Neo-Ottomans. The author argues a counter-intuitive point very effectively, that the 
secular establishment is less open to the West than the Islamic oriented Neo-Ottomans. 
This paper explains a modern cleavage in Turkish society from the perspective of an 
internationally recognized expert. 
Another work outlining the Kemalist-Islamist cleavage is “21st Century 
Kemalism: Redefining Turkey-EU Relations in the Post-Helsinki Era.” This piece also 
identifies the Kemalist-cleavage, although it was written before the rise of the ruling 
Justice and Development Party. Thus, it is somewhat of a “prequel” to Taspinar’s piece. 
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Tocci’s greatest contribution is defining the Kemalist concept of a nation-state. In 
addition, the author shows how this nation-state, based on the Turkish identity, influences 
Turkish foreign policy in Azerbaijan and Cyprus. The author also covers Turkey’s efforts 
to be a full-fledged member of the ESDP. 
As Turkey’s struggle with both the Kurdish insurgency and the question of 
Kurdish identity figures so large in this thesis, it is important to gain some understanding 
of these issues. Much of this paper draws on official government sources from the United 
States and Turkey. In order to gain a sense of balance, the author chose The Kurds: A 
People in Search of their Homeland by Kevin McKiernan. The author provides a good 
history of the Kurds, but more importantly, he provides his own research done on the 
ground. The author is one of the few Americans to have met the PKK terrorist leader 
Abdullah Ocalan. Perhaps most importantly, the author spent considerable time reporting 
from Turkey and Northern Iraq from the time of Operation DESERT STORM through 
the present. He reports on the sometimes-conflicting relationships between Turkey, the 
United States, the Kurds, and Europe. As a source often critical of Turkey and the United 
States (Noam Chomsky praised the book!), the book provides a counterpoint to official 
American and Turkish sources. 
Atilla Darendelli’s DTIC thesis Turkey and European Union Relations presents a 
Turkish military perspective n this important issue. The author views EU membership as 
Turkey’s just reward for the sacrifices Turkey made in the Cold War in support of the 
NATO mission. This paper provides a good window into official Turkish objectives and 
what drives its involvement in European security institutions. 
Nora Ben Sahel’s DTIC paper The Counter-Terror Coalition deals with ways in 
which NATO and the European Union can cooperate to fight terror. It covers the events 
before and after Operation ENDURING FREEDOM and also elaborates upon Turkey’s 
contribution to this operation. It is a useful resource for illustrating Turkey’s past 
contributions to European security institution-driven operations.  
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C. METHODS AND SOURCES 
This thesis will perform a historical analysis of Turkey’s relationship with 
European security institutions with a particular emphasis on recent history, specifically 
the past ten years. 
This thesis will utilize documents written by military professionals, both 
American and Turkish, to obtain the views held within the Department of Defense and 
the Turkish military establishment. This is particularly important in the Turkish model, as 
it is this author’s experience that Turkish military personnel are less likely than their 
American counterparts to state their personal opinions unless in an approved setting (such 
as a Master’s Thesis). 
In addition, it will utilize web-based documents from the European Union, The 
Department of Defense, Department of State, NATO, and the Turkish government. The 
dynamic nature of the topic and the focus on recent events make the use of web-based 
material necessary. Websites are considerably more agile than books: they can be 
updated. 
Published books such as those outlined in the review of literature serve to flesh 
out the thesis, particularly in terms of historical background. 
D. THESIS OVERVIEW 
The thesis begins with an introduction and a historical overview of Turkey, 
stretching from the final years of the Ottoman Empire to today. The introduction, 
encompassing much of the submitted thesis proposal, will serve as a road map for the 
thesis. 
The thesis will then cover NATO, the oldest and most significant of Turkey’s 
relationships. This section will serve to establish how Turkey historically conducted its 
relationships with European security institutions. 
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Then, the thesis will cover Turkey’s relationship with the ESDP, a smaller 
relationship than that with NATO, but with significant ramifications for Turkey’s future 
relationship with the EU (and America!) 
Next, the thesis will look at the unique challenges and problems facing Turkey’s 
relationship. These problems include the Cyprus question, the Armenian tragedy of 1915 
and the current drive to name it as genocide, Turkey’s internal politics, and Turkey’s 
relationship with the United States. 
Finally, the conclusion will review the relationships and note various possible 
courses of action that the parties will take (without attempting to proscribe any lessons 
learned or predictions of the future!).  
The thesis will reference documents from the EU, NATO, as well as the Turkish 
foreign ministry. It will address the stated position of both the EU and Turkey, and thus, 
provide a better understanding of the specific challenges and opportunities in Turkey’s 
road to EU accession. 
Yet, this thesis will not simply look at these topics from a neutral point of view. 
This paper has a clear argument on the subject of Turkey’s policies and their effects on 
European integration. Specifically, with the exception of Turkey’s military capability, 
many of its actions and policies work against its inclusion. This is unfortunate and 
counterproductive because if Turkey and its powerful military were integrated into the 
European Union, Turkey could better achieve an independent defensive capability. Thus, 
Turkey’s European integration would meet one of Europe’s great shortfalls; it has plenty 
of “soft power” but its ability to project coercive power is limited. By achieving this 
increased defensive capability, Europe would be better able to face the growing threat of 
terror and Middle East instability. 
Europe perceives Turkey as “the other” for reasons both founded and unfounded, 
and this fear works to prevent Turkish integration. Europe has unfounded fears of Turkey 
based on a fear of Muslims and memories of Ottoman aggression. These fears work 
against Turkish integration. Yet, some of Europe’s fears are because Turkey and Europe 
simply differ on many issues that Europe holds important. Europe and Turkey hold vastly 
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different positions on capitol punishment, the Armenian tragedy of 1915, the role of the 
military in society, and civil society in general. This thesis states that ultimately, these 
differences outweigh any possible advantages to Turkish integration and Turkey will not 
integrate until these issues are resolved. 
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II. TURKEY’S OTTOMAN LEGACY AND IT EFFECTS 
A. BACKGROUND 
What is the history of Turkish-European relations? Ottoman history has much to 
do with Turkish-European relations today. The Ottoman Empire was the ruling power in 
the Central Middle East from the early 1500s until the end of World War I. It ruled over a 
huge empire that stretched across North Africa to the Arabian Peninsula up to the Crimea 
and over much of Eastern Europe. The Ottomans reached Vienna in 1529 and 1683. In 
this period, the survival of Christian Europe was in serious jeopardy. Queen Elizabeth I’s 
historian called the contemporary Ottoman Empire “the present terror of the world.”3 It is 
these memories that contribute to Europe’s fear of “the Turk.” 
How was the Ottoman Empire ruled? Who were the key decision makers on the 
political and social levels? What was the relationship between these entities? 
The sultan led the Ottoman elite, but at the heart of the political power, was the 
Ottoman military. However, the Ottomans did not simply use their military to conquer 
territory, but also for economic reasons. In fact, the Ottoman military first acquired a 
navy to control the trade routes and wrest them away from the Italian city-states.4 Yet, 
the basis of Ottoman military strength was the janissaries-the best infantry in Europe 
during the 15th and 16th centuries.5 The janissaries were a slave army recruited from the 
non-Muslim population of the empire. 
Another key player was the Ottoman civil service. The Ottoman civil service ran a 
huge bureaucracy. Yet, the Ottomans did not have a single, unchanging administrative 
system. A key to the Ottoman system was the utilization of flexible administrative 
practices to meet the different needs of different groups and cultures. In fact, the 
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Ottomans were tolerant of local customs. “As long as taxes were remitted and stability 
was maintained, the Ottomans were content to tolerate the existence of a wide variety of 
local practices.”6 In fact, the Ottomans were able to govern nations that in recent years 
appeared ungovernable (Algeria, Iraq) by essentially ignoring the locals except for the 
collection of taxes. Another example of Ottoman tolerance and pragmatism was the 
millet system. The Ottomans used the millet system to rule non-Muslim subjects. The 
Ottomans approved the leading official from the Greek Orthodox, Armenian Orthodox, 
and Jewish communities and allowed them to run the affairs of their respective groups. 
The leaders of the minority groups were responsible to the sultan for the continued good 
behavior of their community. This provided them more autonomy than their peers 
enjoyed in Europe at the time, but they were still second-class citizens. As long as the 
unquestioned rule of the sultan, and an official status of inferiority before the law, was 
accepted, Christian subjects could rise and profit from their allegiance.7 
The Ulama (individuals specially trained in Muslim religious doctrine) thus 
formed another part of the ruling class. They helped administer Shariah law through a 
hierarchical system of judges.8 Yet, the religious judicial system was still under the 
control of the sultan and the judges could be dismissed by the sultan. 
What was the relationship between these groups? The sultan was the ultimate 
authority: he approved the ulama, the millet leaders, and the bureaucrats. The 
bureaucrats, in turn, collected the taxes that supported the sultan’s empire. The 
bureaucrats also ran the devshirme system. This system of taking non-Muslim children 
and raising them as servants of the sultan (as soldiers or bureaucrats) enabled the 
functioning of the empire. Yet, the devshirme was also a key form of social mobility. It 
was not hereditary: free Muslims could not send their children. It was a meritocracy that 
allowed the poor a chance to rise to the top. The ulama provided the sultan with the  
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religious backing for his empire, and also arbitrated the disputes of the people. The millet 
provided the sultan with the promise of good behavior of their group in exchange for 
more autonomy and rights. 
Yet in the 18th and 19th centuries, the balance of power slowly but decidedly 
changed to the West. The Ottoman Empire weakened to the point that after Napoleon’s 
defeat, they were not deemed important enough to be invited to the post-war 1814 
Congress of Vienna.9 During this period of decline, the Empire also attempted reform. 
What was the goal of the Ottoman reform movement? It was to turn back the tide of 
setbacks and preserve the empire. The key period of Ottoman reform was in the 19th 
century. Within this time, the period from 1839 until 1876 is known as the Tanzimat, or 
reorganization. It was the most intense phase of Ottoman reform in the 19th century.10  
One such important reform of this time was the Royal Decree of 1839. This 
decree promised reforms, abolishing of tax farms, less corruption, and changes to the 
conscription system.11 Yet, the regime did not appear to abide by this decree because the 
New Decree of 1856 repeated the promises of the 1839 decree, stressing equal rights and 
obligations for Muslims and non-Muslims alike.12 The intention was to stop the tide of 
nationalism and keep the Christian subjects loyal. 
The Ottoman Empire also introduced new legal codes. These codes kept shariah 
law, but were inspired by European codes of law.13 Again, this policy of reform was an 
attempt to adopt some of Europe’s reforms and modernization and stave off defeat at 
Europe’s hands.  
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In 1876, the Ottomans installed a new constitution. This document was another 
attempt to learn from the success of the Europeans as concerned state and society. The 
constitution called for an elected chamber of deputies and an appointed senate. However, 
the sultan still had overall control. Worse, the constitution was dissolved in 1878 in the 
wake of war. 
In the first decade of the 20th century, the Young Turks demanded a return to the 
1876 Constitution. Who were these people? The Young Turks were comprised of four 
groups: exiles, disaffected civil servants, students, and army officers. The Young Turks 
saw the growing German and British strength (and rivalry) and urgently tried to reform 
the military.14 While the Young Turks were oppressive of minorities within the empire, 
they fought for a more efficient government. Yet, they also alienated such key groups in 
society as the Arab leadership, a step that later became significant during World War I in 
the face of British policy to foment upheaval. 
Although the Ottoman Empire no longer exists, and the modern Turkish Republic 
is 85 years old, modern Europe still has a somewhat troubled relationship with its Muslim 
(Turkish and non-Turkish) minority. No less than Charles de Gaulle objected to Muslims 
integrating into Europe. He stated that, “If we integrate them, if all the Arabs and Berbers 
of Algeria were considered French, how could they be prevented from settling in France, 
where the standard of living is so much higher? My village would no longer be called 
Columbey-les-deux-Eglises [Columbey of the two churches], but Columbey-les-deux-
mosquees.”15 De Gaulle made this comment in 1959, in the middle of the Algerian 
insurgency. De Gaulle also stated that French and European civilization was European 
and “white.”  
In fact, French-Turkish rivalry has a long history deeply connected with the rise 
of France as the leading national power and hegemon of continental Europe and the so-
called Eastern Question in the 18th and 19th centuries. In 1797, France acquired territory 
in the Balkans adjacent to the Ottoman Empire. “The old friend became a new neighbor, 
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and friendship did not survive the shock.”16 The French made rules against privileges for 
hereditary nobility, and encouraged nationalism in the people of the Balkans, especially 
the Greek Orthodox as heirs to the revolution. The Ottomans believed that the French 
were inciting the Greeks through Republicanism, and were working to corrupt the minds 
of the Ottoman minorities.17 In a sense, France injected a virus into the Ottoman Empire 
in the form of nationalism and national consciousness. It did not destroy the empire 
immediately, but once these new ideas reached the Greek, Armenian, and Arab subjects 
of the empire, the effect was to set up national movements that would rear the empire 
apart.  
However, the relationship with Europe was not just a rivalry but also an exchange 
of ideas, including in the arena of professional military education. The Turkish military’s 
use of modern tactics and organization has deep roots in the Ottoman Empire. In the 
autumn of 1793, the sultan sent a message to Paris with a list of the officers and 
technicians whom he wished to recruit from France.18 Later, in the 1830s, Sultan 
Mahmud II sought the aid of Western governments in modernizing his armed forces, to 
include Prussian and British advisory teams.19 The Ottomans also began sending their 
officers to Western military academies and staff colleges,20 a practice that continues 
today in the modern Turkish military (to include Naval Postgraduate School!). Where did 
this concept of using school systems to build a common identity originate? In the late 
Ottoman period, Sultan Abdulhammid II established almost 15,000 new religious 
schools.21 The founders of the Turkish Republic were educated in these schools, and they 
shaped many of their outlooks and beliefs.22 Later, the early Republic also sought to de-
politicize the military by forbidding officers from holding public office.23  
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Abdulhammid also brought a German General, Baron Wilhelm Leopold von der 
Goltz, to train Ottoman cadets in a forerunner of defense reform as it is understood today. 
Again, the early leaders of the Turkish Republic are part of this legacy of Prussian 
German military thought as concern the soldier and the state.24 Therefore, the look 
westward for educational opportunities are neither a modern trend nor even just a trend 
from the beginning of the Turkish Republic. Rather, such policy is part of a process going 
back to the later Ottoman period and continues today within NATO, but also in the policy 
of Turkey in the Partnership for Peace (PfP) and beyond.  
When people think of Turkey’s look to the West for new ideas, many people think 
of Ataturk. What are some of the origins of Ataturk’s attempt to emulate the West as a 
process of reform? Before World War I, Ataturk served as an Ottoman military attaché in 
Berlin and Sofia, an experience that exposed him to European concepts of government 
and military organization. His experience in these positions increased his desire to 
emulate Central Europe and adopt many of its practices.25 Hence, Ataturk’s look to the 
West also has its origins in the history of the Ottoman military in the modern period. This 
fact is relevant to today’s civil-military picture because today’s Turkish officer corps take 
Ataturk’s example and legacy as their personal code of conduct. In fact, at their 
commissioning, Turkish officers pronounce the following oath: “I will remain loyal to 
Ataturk’s principles and reforms, and I will defend them.”26 
It is also important to note that when Ataturk decided that Turkey needed to be a 
part of Western civilization, he was not thinking of the United States, but rather Europe.27 
The United States had not yet stepped onto the world stage as a superpower but was 
rather a distant power in the years before the Second World War. Turkey’s alignment 
with the United States occurred only after World War II. This long-term affinity for  
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Europe gains importance in the context of European integration and whether Turkey will 
tilt toward Europe or the United States (or whether the three parties can work together 
and avoid this zero-sum game situation). 
While the Ottoman Empire’s Turkish Republican heirs earned a reputation as 
ardent secularists, this is not entirely true. The early Republic realized that Islam was a 
powerful rallying point around which to organize resistance to the Allied occupation. “In 
order to protect its founding ideology, the Kemalist elite opportunistically employed 
Islam for the realization of a modern and secular Turkey.”28 In order to rally the nation, 
Ataturk stressed the Islamic nature of the War of Independence to the Turkish people.29 
During the war of independence, the Kurds fought on the same side as the Turkish forces, 
but “as Sunni Muslims, they viewed the conflict as religious, not nationalistic.”30 Even 
today, in the office of the imam for Ankara’s main Kocatepe mosque, there is a giant 
photo of Ataturk performing namas. Clearly, as a government approved mosque, this 
photo serves to meet the state’s narrative, but it is still interesting in that it disproves the 
myth that Ataturk was actually anti-religious. 
While this study earlier discussed the similarities between the Ottoman soldiers of 
the past and today’s Turkish military, there are significant differences that deserve their 
due analysis. Yet, such changes actually originated in the late Ottoman period. “The 
Nineteenth Century Ottoman elites sought to consolidate state power primarily by 
modernizing the army, a process that transformed the army into a trendsetter and an agent 
for ordering the society in accordance with the needs of the state.”31  
In the move from the Ottoman Empire to the Turkish Republic, not only were 
there breaks in the military culture, but also of civil society. Earlier, this paper looked at 
the less publicized role of Islamic identity in the post-World War I struggle for 
independence. While this role is interesting, the idea of de-Islamization of the state has 
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much basis in fact. In the early Turkish Republic, state sponsored history stressed the pre-
Islamic Turkishness, and downplayed the Islamic and Ottoman history. Some Turkish 
intellectuals criticized this revision of history, but the government suppressed them.32 
Yet, the Turkish modernization of the early Turkish Republic is seen as both a 
continuation of 19th century Ottoman reform, but was also intended to root out 
“Ottomanism.”33 Interestingly, the move from an empire to an even more centralized 
form of government is similar to what happened in France one hundred years earlier. 
Tocqueville believed that the aftermath of the overthrow of the monarchy is actually a 
more powerful and central government. “Whenever a nation destroys its aristocracy, it 
almost automatically leads toward a centralization of power.”34 In the case of the 
Ottomans, their replacement was also a more powerful, central and ambitious 
government that tasked itself with the reinvention of the national identity. 
There was also a practical side to the de-Islamization of the early Turkish 
Republic. During the period between the end of the Ottoman Empire, and the founding of 
the Turkish Republic, the British invited both the Republican forces and representatives 
of the caliphate to negotiations. This had the potential to weaken the bargaining position 
of the Turkish side through “divide and conquer.” By abolishing the caliphate, Ataturk 
tactically outmaneuvered both his Turkish rivals and the British by delegitimizing his 
internal Turkish competition.35 
While speaking of the Turkish War of Independence, one recalls it as the first 
successful nationalist revolution in Asia or Africa.36 At first, Ataturk’s successful revolt 
gave Muslims inspiration as a way to beat the West at its own game, but Ataturk went on, 
to secularize Turkey, and to push Turkey toward Europe. Thus, Turkey antagonized 
Muslims of other nations who were at first supportive of its successes.37 Hence, just as 
                                                 
32 Yavuz, Islamic Political Identity in Turkey, 51. 
33 Cleveland, A History of the Modern Middle East, 180. 
34 Alexis de Tocqueville, The Old Régime and the French Revolution (New York: Anchor Books. 
1983), 60. 
35 Cleveland, A History of the Modern Middle East, 178. 
36 Lewis, The Middle East: A Brief History of the Last 2,000 Years, 346. 
37 Ibid. 
 21
the early Turkish Republic used Islam to rally its people, the early Turkish Republic was 
an inspiration to other Muslims. Further, as the later Turkish Republic suppressed the 
public role of Islam, other Muslims lost some of their enthusiasm for the Turkish 
successes. Ataturk and the early leaders of the Turkish Republic, in fact, made a 
conscious effort to limit Pan-Islamic foreign policy, and this follows the commonly 
understood narrative of Turkey breaking with its Ottoman past and embracing the 
Western concept of modernity.  
Yet, what is even more interesting is that this early leadership also rejected a 
foreign policy based on Pan-Turkism. Therefore, while Turkey extracted itself from the 
ruins of the Ottoman Empire by creating a nation-state based on a shared Turkish 
identity, Turkey did not pursue this idea in foreign policy. For example, Ataturk’s early 
Turkish Republic refused to engage in the liberation movements resisting the Bolsheviks’ 
power consolidation in post-Czarist Central Asia. Turkey identified that its national 
interests were not at stake in these conflicts.  
This is not to say that some Turks did not seek to come to the aid of these national 
liberation movements. In fact, Enver Pasha died in Tajikistan while supporting the 
Basmachis rebellion against the Bolsheviks in 1922.38 In 1996, Turkey flew his body 
back to Turkey for a burial with honors. With the opening of former Soviet Central Asia 
in the 1990s, the idea of Pan-Turkism was once again popular. Turkey’s Pan-Turkic 
foreign policy of the 1990s was a departure from the early Republic’s goal of staying out 
of foreign entanglements. Turkey sought to maintain correct relations with the Soviet 
Union. Ataturk himself considered both Pan-Islamic and Pan-Turkic foreign policy as 
counterproductive. On this subject, he stated Turkey’s national identity was at once very 
restrictive and also very open. It could not countenance a separate Kurdish identity, as a 
Muslim in Turkey was a Turk. It lost the cosmopolitanism of the Ottoman Empire with 
its large Greek, Armenian and Jewish populations. Yet, for those minorities who choose 
to engage with the nation within the state rules, Turkey can be very open. The definition 
of Turk became anyone living in Turkey who identified themselves as a Turk. 
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B. TURKEY AND THE EUROPEAN COMMON MARKET/EC/EU  
The early Turkish Republic’s move toward the West and a secular democracy 
were followed in the post World War II by continued efforts to integrate with Europe. 
What is Turkey’s past experience with the EU membership process?39 The European 
common market of the time established the original roadmap in the 1964 Ankara 
Agreement40 at a time when the political proposition of affiliation or membership in the 
common market had a different political character than in the past decade. During the 
1990s, Turkey made very little progress in meeting the EU’s political conditions, but the 
nation increased its progress after 2000.41 
The 1993 Copenhagen EU Summit set the political and economic standards for 
economic parameters for EU candidate states, such things as democracy, human rights, 
rule of law, and protection of minorities.42 It also asked that Turkey peacefully resolve 
the Kurdish insurgency.43 Despite these positive steps in the early 1990s, the EU did not 
invite Turkey to the 1997 Luxembourg Summit, and in response, Turkey suspended its 
participation in the Association Council.44 
The Helsinki EU Summit of December 1999 declared, “Turkey is a candidate 
state destined to join the Union on the basis of the same [Copenhagen] criteria as applied 
to the other candidate states.”45 It was Turkey’s progress concerning democratic reforms 
and human rights, along with better Turkish-Greek relations, that led to Turkey’s 
recognition as an “official candidate” at the Helsinki Council of 1999.46  
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From the Turkish perspective, this slow progress was disappointing and 
incongruous with the role Turkey played in Europe. The EU is the only major European 
organization of which Turkey is not yet a full member.47  
While one can look at Turkey’s integration from the macro level, Turkey’s 
integration can also be seen from the perspective of actual integration of ethnic Turks into 
European society, and in this arena, there has been some recent success stories. Recently, 
some encouraging news on this subject emerged in Germany where the German Green 
Party elected Cam Ozdemir as their leader. According to the International Herald Tribune 
(November 16, 2008), Mr. Ozdemir’s parents arrived as guest workers in the 1960s. In 
this article, Mr. Ozdemir stated, “I want a society where everyone has an equal chance, 
regardless of where they come from.” Mr. Ozdemir’s rise is seen not just as the rise of 
Turks in Germany (there were one million Germans of Turkish descent eligible to vote in 
the 2005 election) but an opening up of German society in general. German identity thus 
appears to be less tied to one’s ancestry and ethnicity. If so, this bodes well for Turkey’s 
own European Union candidacy. Green Party Chair Ozdemir is a social scientist by trade: 
education was his key to social mobility and political power. Unfortunately, he is in some 
respects an exception. According to German population studies, Turkish second 
generation immigrants lag behind immigrants from all other European nations, including 
the Former Yugoslavia.48 How is this known? The Germans use the 10-year census, but 
also a Mikrozensus: a 1% annual random sample of the population.  
Is it in the interest of the United States that the status of Turks in Europe 
improves? The United States views Turkish integration into Europe in its national 
interest, and a prosperous integrated Turkish community in Europe would facilitate the 
process of Turkish integration. Yet, how can the United States improve this situation? It 
can appeal to the self-interest of Europe. The European “pay as you go” pension system 
depends on high earning power. By empowering its population to earn more, Europe can 
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safeguard its own social safety net. In addition, education leads to social integration. By 
improving the education of the Turkish minority, the stakeholder can improve the status 
of Turks within Europe; thus, improving the image of Turks. This, in turn, will lead to a 
greater chance of the European integration of Turkey. 
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III. TURKEY AND EU ACCESSION  
A. TURKEY’S EU PROBLEMATIC TRUMP CARD: THE MILITARY 
Turkey has a large military, with an annual defense budget of ten billion dollars, 
the fifteenth largest defense budget in the world.49 In 2004, it had a military of over 
500,000, the largest in Europe.50 Turkey’s military is a mix of professional officers and 
non-commissioned officers; along with a large conscript force (Turkey has universal 
male conscription). The Turkish military also utilizes a system in which conscripts that 
complete their military service (and maintain a good record of conduct) can continue 
service on a contractual basis. The security forces guarding some military facilities (to 
include Incirlik Air Base) utilize this manpower system. Turkey joined NATO in 1952.51 
Turkey’s armed forces and historical ties to both the Balkans and Central Asia make it an 
important force or in outreach by European security institutions. As noted above, 
Turkey’s continued military strength contrasts with Europe’s reliance on “soft power” at 
the expense of coercive capabilities. “While Turkish military capabilities have grown, 
European militaries have shrunk. Since the early 1990’s, EU member countries have 
dramatically decreased their defense expenses in favor of domestic and social spending. 
Currently, major EU countries spend an average of 2% of their GDP on defense, whereas 
the United States spends 4% and Turkey 5.3 %.”52 “The European Union is struggling to 
set up a credible security and defense policy because only Britain and France have armed 
forces with anything approaching a global reach.”53 Again, this all reinforces what 
Turkey can potentially bring to a stronger relationship with Europe. 
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B. RESPONSE TO TERROR: PKK 
As the Turkey’s response to the Kurdish question is one of the main (stated) 
impediments to its attempt to integrate into Europe, it is worth exploring this issue. The 
EU asked that Turkey peacefully resolve the Kurdish insurgency. Turkey’s opponent in 
this struggle is the Partiye Karkeren Kurdistan (Kurdistan Workers Party) or PKK, yet the 
issue of a Kurdish separatist threat to the Turkish Republic is not new. “For the first forty 
years of the Turkish Republic, the authorities viewed the Kurdish region as a trouble spot 
of latent, if not actual resistance, and the area was sealed off by the military until the 
1960’s to prevent contact with outsiders.”54 According to the U.S. State Department, the 
PKK is the most prominent terrorist group in Turkey and is composed of Kurds with a 
separatist agenda.55 According to the Naval Postgraduate School Library Special Topics 
Subject Guide on Terrorism, “The KGK/PKK was founded by Abdullah Ocalan in 1974 
as a Marxist-Leninist separatist organization.”56 The Kurds were promised a homeland 
by the victorious Allies after World War I, but lost it in the Turkish War of 
Independence. Following World War I, Kurdish intellectuals supported a Kurdish state 
and sent representatives to the Paris Peace Conference in 1919.57 The concept of 
intellectuals rallying to their nation and championing it was an important theme of World 
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It fought an insurgency in the 1980s and 1990s in Southeast Turkey that claimed 
thousands of lives. Turkey was frustrated by a perceived lack of support for a fellow 
NATO member under attack by terrorists, and Turkey even attempted to invoke Article V 
to obligate its NATO allies to assist in the fight against the PKK.59 
After capturing Ocalan in 1999, Turkish courts found him guilty of separatist 
treason and sentenced him to death.60 Even though the Turkish government placed a 
moratorium on the death penalty in 1984, it reserved the right to execute Ocalan.61 After 
the Court of Appeals upheld the verdict, Ocalan’s lawyers took the case to the European 
Court of Human Rights (ECHR). The ECHR ordered Turkey (a member of the court’s 
jurisdiction) to suspend the execution until it ruled on the appeal, and the Turkish 
government agreed.62  
International NGO’s also placed pressure upon Turkey. For example, in the 
1990s, Amnesty International lobbied the EU and the Clinton Administration to curtail 
arms sales to Turkey.63 In January 2003, Turkey signed Protocol 6 to the European 
Convention on Human Rights, outlawing the death penalty.64 Thus, Turkish institutions 
tempered Turkish policy, in this case, a high-profile criminal justice issue. This issue 
reveals a serious Turkish-EU cleavage: capital punishment. Turkey and the EU have very 
different views on capital punishment, and this is reflected in civil society (see below). 
There is clearly a serious EU-Turkey divide, yet as noted above, Turkey altered its 
actions to comply with Europe (and, one can assume, to improve EU accession 
opportunities). Interestingly, the United States is closer to Turkey than to Europe on this 
one issue. A Turkish decision to execute a convicted terrorist would cause much less of a 
stir in the United States, where the death penalty is viewed far differently than in Europe.  
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Despite the abovementioned Turkish concessions to Europe, since the summer of 
2007, the Turkish government took a much more aggressive stance toward the PKK. The 
ruling Adalet ve Kalkinma (Justice and Development) or “AK” Party championed 
European integration. Today, the key difference between the AKP and the military is not 
the PKK insurgency, but rather, how to deal with those Kurds who are not part of the 
PKK, both inside and outside of Turkey.  
C. RESPONSE TO TERROR: DHPC-C 
The Naval Postgraduate School Library’s Special Topic Subject Guide on 
Terrorism notes that the DHKP-C is known by several names, including “Dev Sol; Dev 
Sol Armed Revolutionary Units; Dev Sol Silahli Devrimci Birlikleri; Dev Sol SDB; 
Devrimci Halk Kurtulus Partisi-Cephesi; Devrimci Sol; Revolutionary Left.”65 They 
formed in 1978, with the goal of establishing a socialist state in Turkey. They are anti-
Turkish, anti-U.S., and anti-NATO. In the past, they killed two Americans, and bombed 
over 20 U.S. and NATO facilities.66  
The DHKP-C consider themselves part of the “world Communist body,” and as 
such, are somewhat of an anachronism whose “best days” appear to be behind them. Yet, 
they maintain a cadre of trained terrorists, showed a past capability for tradecraft and 
professionally executed attacks, and as such, they remain a threat. The DHKP-C-
addressed the 1996 annual seminar of Communist parties in Brussels. At this meeting, 
they declared, “The DHKP-C are the ones who fight for the Kurd, Turks, for the 
oppressed.”67 Interestingly, in this speech, the DHKP-C admitted that in the Middle East, 
revolutionary movements have been overtaken over by Islamic radicalism. As such, they 
are part of the greater trend of the older Soviet-style terror groups of the 1970s and 1980s  
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that have lost a lot of ground to the Islamists. Thirty years ago, disaffected young people 
joined the DHKP-C’s, the Baader-Meinhof’s, and the PLO’s. Today, these young people 
would join one of the various Islamist terror groups. 
D. CLEAVAGES IN THE RESPONSE TO TERROR 
Despite the fact that these groups operate in both Europe and Turkey, the 
governments of Europe have varying responses to both the PKK and the DHKP-C. For 
example, the United States 2008 Country Report on Terrorism, authored by the State 
Department Counter-Terrorism Coordination Office, admonishes Austria for its handling 
of the PKK and states that Austria “failed to coordinate fully law enforcement activities 
with other states against the militant Kurdish separatist group Kongra Gel/Kurdistan 
Workers Party (KGK/PKK), an EU and U.S. assigned terrorist group.”68 In 2007, Austria 
released PKK leader Riza Altun and allowed him to fly on to Northern Iraq, even though 
he traveled on false documents. Additionally, he was wanted by France and Turkey. In 
November 2007, Austria failed to detain Remni Kartal, another PKK leader wanted by 
Interpol.69  
In 2006, Belgium convicted several members of the DHKP-C. Yet in 2007, the 
case was overturned and is now being retried in Belgium.70 This led to a diplomatic 
dispute with Turkey, which will be elaborated upon below. Denmark hosts a group that, 
according to Turkey (and the U.S. State Department71), is a terrorist organization. The 
Roj media organization is labeled a PKK affiliate. Roj TV (http://www.roj.tv) showed 
film clips of PKK guerillas in the field and other propaganda items (although lately this 
has disappeared from the website). 
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In February 2007, France arrested 16 Kurds suspected of being part of the PKK 
on charges of extortion, money laundering, and terrorism financing. Riza Altun was one 
of those arrested. He posted bail, fled to Austria, and as noted above, was allowed by 
Austrian authorities to depart for Northern Iraq. 
The United States also notes that the PKK maintains a presence in Italy and uses 
charitable donations to raise funds there.72 Overall, these groups use Europe as a place to 
raise funds, from which to disseminate propaganda, and as a safe refuge. These benefits 
are force multipliers for their operations against Turkey and other targets. 
E. EFFECTS ON TURKISH-EUROPEAN RELATIONS 
According to the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the overturning of the 
convictions of the DHKP-C defendants by Belgium was against “the fundamental 
principles of the global fight against terrorism, first and foremost with resolutions of the 
United Nations Security Council.”73 It goes on to state, “The Turkish people who have 
sacrificed thousands of victims to terrorism resent the decision of the court.”74 Clearly, 
there is some dispute here.  
The PKK killed hundreds of people in Turkey in the last two years, and on 
October 17, 2007, the Turkish Parliament passed a motion allowing the Turkish military 
to cross into Northern Iraq to attack the PKK. It is for this reason that the situation of the 
PKK in Europe is important to the United States. The PKK and DHKP-C draw strength 
from their European assets. If the United States can help shut these operations down, it 
will significantly weaken the capabilities of these terrorist organizations. This, in turn, 
will lessen the PKK’s ability to harm Turkey, and thus, lessen Turkish incentives to enter  
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Northern Iraq. Obviously, a sustained Turkish operation in Northern Iraq would seriously 
complicate the U.S. mission in Iraq. Northern Iraq is one of the only success stories-
America needs very few forces there to maintain order. 
Additionally, Turkey allows the use of Incirlik Air Base as an air refueling/cargo 
hub in support of Operations ENDURING FREEDOM and IRAQI FREEDOM. This hub 
saves the U.S. $160 million per year in lower aircraft use and fuel costs.75 In addition, 
Turkey allows the use of the Habur Gate border crossing for movement of supplies in 
support of Coalition troops in Iraq. Turkey thus has some leverage over the United States 
and it is in the U.S.’s interest to help Turkey solve its terror issues. 
Concerning the gulf between Turkey and Europe concerning terror, there are 
some reasons for optimism. One reason for optimism is that the DHKP-C openly abuses 
the hospitality of its hosts, especially in Belgium. Through its website, it claimed that 
“The Belgian police have not grasped that our office only exists to inform public opinion 
about the repression, atrocities, and injustices committed in Turkey and the world.76“ 
While calling Turkey a fascist state, it also calls Belgium “a democratic parody” and an 
“imperialist state.” It then goes on to say “A word of advice to the Belgian police: if they 
honestly seek terrorists, they should be spying on the embassies of Israel and Turkey.”77 
This statement clearly reveals that the organization is acting like an ungrateful 
houseguest. While the PKK seems to do a better job of not antagonizing its hosts, the 
DHKP-C appears to enjoy doing so. This diminished any goodwill on the part of the host 
government toward their organization.  
Turkey’s frustration with European terror policy exposes the cleavage between 
the two concerning mindset. Turkey sees terrorist groups, while Europe sees ethnic 
separatists and militant leftists. Europe’s failure to take on these organizations 
aggressively contributes to Turkish distrust for Europe, and thus, diminishes enthusiasm 
for European integration. Despite these issues, Belgium professes to have very good 
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relations with Turkey. According to the Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Relations 
between Belgium and Turkey are characterized by exemplary loyalty and cooperation.”78 
Belgium goes on to note, “Over the last 40 years, a community of Turkish immigrants 
has been living peacefully in Belgium and contributing to the country’s prosperity.”79 
Belgium also states that it supports Turkey’s EU candidacy. This is actually quite 
interesting that despite the wide gulf between Turkey and Belgium on this issue, Belgium 
still supports Turkey’s candidacy. Clearly, there are subtle nuances: not all Turkish-
European cleavages inhibit Turkish integration. 
F. RELATIONS/DIPLOMACY IN THE BALKANS 
Despite differences with Western Europe over terrorism and human rights, 
Turkey also found success diplomatically in the Balkans. Turkey enjoys good relations 
with Macedonia/FYROM. There are 78,000 Macedonians of Turkish origin according to 
the Turkish government, as well as over 1,000 Turkish citizens living in the country. 
They comprise almost 4% of the population of FYROM.80 According to the Turkish 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Turkey also attaches importance to the equitable 
representation of the Turkish community in Macedonia.”81 In fact, the Turks of FYROM 
can be called an ethnic success story when compared to the many other ethnic conflicts in 
the area. This is especially interesting in light of the fact that during Ottoman times, these 
relationships were not always so good. In the late Ottoman period, there was in fact 
serious violence. In 1893, the Central Macedonian Revolutionary Committee formed. 
This committee then formed the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization 
(IMRO), led by two schoolteachers.82 The IMRO attacked Turks in Macedonia and 
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started a revolt in 1903. The Ottoman Empire suppressed this revolt, and in the process, 
destroyed 200 villages, killed thousands of people, and forced 30,000 refugees to flee into 
Bulgaria.83 
Additionally, the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs states, “Turkey and the 
Republic of Macedonia have established very close and friendly relations since the 
independence of Macedonia in 1991.”84 Note that Turkey does not use the word 
“FYROM,” but rather “the Republic of Macedonia.” The Turkish Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs helpfully notes that, “Turkey recognized the Republic of Macedonia with its 
constitutional name.”85 This gesture can be interpreted as respect for FYROM and an 
attempt to make life easier for the Turkish minority of FYROM. Yet, the FYROM “name 
crisis” is based on the insistence of Greece that there not be a nation with the same name 
as Greece’s province of Macedonia. By recognizing FYROM as the Republic of 
Macedonia, Turkey not only maintains good relations with Macedonia (and the Turkish 
minority in Macedonia), but it also can tweak its rival Greece as well. Yet, through the 
lens of European integration, this is clearly not helpful for Turkey. Turkey is annoying an 
EU member state that has the ability to inhibit its European integration process. In this 
case, Turkey’s rivalry with Greece works against its goals. However, at this point, one 
must acknowledge the very real progress in Turkish-Greek relations. In 1999, relations 
hit an incredible low point. Turkish forces tracked PKK terrorist leader Ocalan to the 
Greek Embassy compound in Kenya, thus revealing official Greek support of the PKK. 
Yet, within five years, the President of Greece was a guest of honor at the wedding of 
Prime Minister Erdogan’s daughter (interestingly, while Turkey’s secular Kemalist 
President Ahmet Necdet Sezer declined the invitation, apparently due to the overtly 
Islamic nature of the wedding!) 
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G. RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES  
In the past five years, there were two distinct crises in U.S.-Turkish relations. The 
first occurred in March 2003 when the Turkish Grand National Assembly (TGNA) 
rejected the U.S. request to allow a northern invasion route into Turkey. The second 
occurred in 2007 with the combination of the ongoing PKK insurgency and the United 
States Congress’ consideration of a bill recognizing the Armenian tragedy of 1915 as 
genocide.86  
The low point of Turkish-American relations came on July 4, 2003, when 
American troops captured 11 members of the Turkish Special Forces on the suspicion 
that they were in Northern Iraq to assassinate a prominent Kurd. The Turkish unit was 
also accused of supplying weapons to the Turkmen Front, representing the ethnic 
Turkmen in the disputed city of Kirkuk.87 The fact that the Americans covered the 
captured Turkish soldiers with hoods reverberated in Turkish society. One has to spend 
time among Turks and among their military to understand just how much pride and 
shame mean in their society, especially the military. This writer once witnessed a traffic 
altercation in Turkey that escalated to a near brawl that needed to be broken up 
physically; one driver had said to another “Sen Serefsiz,” or “You are without honor.” 
Those are fighting words in Turkey, whereas in America it would simply be considered 
rude. Yet, in the much more nationalistic and prideful Europe of 50 years ago, these 
would be fighting words as well.  
The July 4, 2003 hood incident reverberated so greatly in Turkish society that it 
became the subject of the highest budget film in the history of Turkish cinema: “Valley 
of the Wolves Iraq.” The United States military deemed the film and its viewers 
potentially dangerous enough that USEUCOM directed troops to avoid theaters showing 
the film.88 The film is extremely inflammatory. The film opens with a fictionalized scene 
of the hood incident. In this fictionalized scenario, one of the victims of the “hood 
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incident” returns to Turkey and finds his honor so besmirched that he commits suicide in 
full service dress uniform. American actor Gary Busey portrays an American doctor 
working in Iraq engaged in organ harvesting. The film notes that this character is also 
Jewish. American actor Billy Zane portrays a sadistic American commander. The Kurds 
are portrayed as thugs, and in one scene, the protagonists kill several Kurdish border 
guards as they enter Iraq. It is important to note that the narrative presented in this film 
went largely unchallenged in Turkish society. The July 4 incident seriously affected the 
perception of America in Turkey, just as Turkey’s March 2003 refusal to open a second 
front affected Turkey’s position in American public opinion. 
What was Turkey’s interest in Northern Iraq? Again, Turkey opposed Operation 
IRAQI FREEDOM and saw Saddam’s Ba’athist regime as a useful check on Kurdish 
separatism in Iraq.89 A check on Kurdish separatism in Iraq was thus, in turn, a check on 
Turkey’s Kurdish separatists. 
Yet, the relationship never deteriorated to the brink. Following the November 5, 
2007 meeting between President Bush and President Gul, Bush identified the PKK as a 
“common enemy” and promised “actionable intelligence.”90 The relationship recovered. 
Prime Minister Erdogan even noted that there is “No need to turn a new page as relations 
were already excellent.” 
While the AK party is known as an Islamic-based party, the AK Party actually 
bucked popular opinion (very anti-American) to pursue ties with the Bush Administration 
after the Iraq war.91  
H. INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: THE ARMENIAN ISSUE  
Another issue critical not only to Turkey’s relationship with the United States and 
Europe, but also in its own right, is the Armenian issue. While Turkey’s relationship with 
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the United States is that of allies who disagree on issues, the Armenian issue is another 
matter altogether. This issue not only challenges the Turkish narrative of the Republic’s 
origin, but also involves a modern nation that neighbors Turkey, and with whom, Turkey 
has had a very troubled relationship. To understand the current Armenian issue, one has 
to look at the final years of the Ottoman Empire. With the rise of nationalism and the new 
European concept of national identity in the 1800s, these ideas spread to the Ottoman 
Empire. In a sense, Europe infected the Ottoman Empire with these new ideas, giving the 
Empire’s minorities new identities that could not continue to exist within the framework 
of Ottoman rule. The minority uprisings against the Ottoman Empire before and during 
World War I affect the Turkish military to this day. This writer has heard Turkish officers 
tell him point blank (unsolicited!) “Never trust an Arab.” Yet, this does not tell the whole 
story. “During all these struggles and upheavals, the vast majority of the subjects of the 
Ottoman Empire, irrespective of their ethnic and religious identities, remained loyal. 
Even among the Armenians and the Arabs, most were peaceful and law-abiding, and their 
men folk served in the sultan’s armies.”92 However, nationalists in these minority groups 
saw the war as their chance to achieve independence.93 The Russians formed volunteer 
units from Armenian citizens of the Ottoman Empire. Also, Armenian guerrillas attacked 
Ottoman forces, especially in Van and Cilicia. Interestingly, while Russia supported the 
Armenian insurgency, the Soviet Union did not support Armenians in the post-war 
struggles. Turkey even cooperated with the new Soviet Union, and made a pact to divide 
and crush Armenia and split it between the two countries.94 This situational cooperation 
with the Soviets is also an example of the pragmatism of the early Turkish Republic; the 
Republic strove for “correct” relations with the Soviets despite ideological differences 
and the traditional rivalry going back to the Ottoman and Russian Empires.  
The Arab rebels fought the Ottomans in the Arabian Peninsulas, and even used 
their Islamic credentials to denounce the Ottoman jihad against England and France. This 
helped the British and French maintain their rule over their Muslim subjects during 
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World War I.95 This point is relevant for today’s struggles; by finding allies within the 
Muslim World, the Allies were able to avoid making World War I a clash of Christianity 
versus Islam. 
For Turkey, these events were “the stab in the back”, just as one school of thought 
in the American military blamed Vietnam’s loss on the domestic anti-war movement and 
the German military blamed their loss in World War I on treachery on the domestic front. 
The Turkish government continues to deal with the legacy of these minority uprisings. 
One such arena in which Turkey must contend with is that of international relations, 
particularly with Europe. In October 2006, the French National Assembly voted to 
support a bill outlawing the denial that Armenians suffered genocide at the hands of the 
Ottoman Empire. Turkey responded by freezing military contacts with France, to include 
military purchasing contracts. According to the International Herald Tribune (November 
16, 2006), a member of Turkey’s opposition party noted, “We tried very hard to stop this 
decision. But as they went ahead, we will retaliate. In international relations, you need to 
use leverage and one of those levers is military spending. We want to punish France.” 
Turkey’s hard-line against France on this issue shows how strongly held its convictions 
are. In fact, Turkey reacted similarly to an American resolution identifying the Armenian 
Tragedy as genocide. The actual champion of the bill was House Speaker Nancy Pelosi, 
whom a contemporary article describes as “a longtime supporter of Armenian-American 
issues.”96 Speaker Pelosi represents a district (and a state) with a large Armenian 
population. Additionally, the late Tom Lantos also championed this cause. Representative 
Lantos was a Holocaust survivor with strong ties to the American Jewish community. 
The Armenian Lobby pushed for the bill, yet in the end, the bill failed. Still, the 2007 
effort by the Armenian Lobby was the strongest to date.97 
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What happened? On October 11, 2007, Turkey recalled its Ambassador “for 
consultations.”98 Then, on October 13, 2007, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan 
stated that U.S.-Turkish relations “could be cut off.” On October 14, Chief of Staff Gen. 
Yasar Buyukanit stated that U.S.-Turkish ties would “never again be the same” if the 
committee passed the resolution.99 These three actions can be seen as brinkmanship on 
the part of Turkey. They are a coordinated upping of the ante and incremental responses 
to perceived negative behavior on the part of the United States.  
Turkey also suspects interest groups connected to certain, specific Jewish 
organizations in the U.S. of having undue influence, yet, this perception induced them in 
no small part to ally with Israel in hopes of influencing American policy through Israel 
and, in turn, the Jewish community of the United States! Turkey signed a military 
agreement with Israel in 1996, which allowed it to receive military equipment and 
technology that the United States and Europe denied Turkey over human rights 
disputes.100 The Turkish-Israeli partnership strengthened Turkey’s hand against the 
Syrians in the 1990s and also provided access to America’s “Jewish Lobby,” thus 
providing a defense against the diplomatic offensives of America’s Greek and Armenian 
lobbies.101 
Yet, this policy became an issue in the Armenian Genocide Resolution debate. In 
the October 23, 2007 edition of the Jerusalem Post, the Turkish Foreign Minister Ali 
Babacan noted telling American Jewish leaders that a genocide bill would strengthen the 
public perception in Turkey that “Armenian and Jewish lobbies unite forces against 
Turks. We have told them that we cannot explain it to the public in Turkey if a road 
accident happens. We have told them that we cannot keep the Jewish people out of 
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this.”102 This statement is clearly a thinly veiled threat, and hence, a form of deterrence. 
Interestingly, the article then touches upon another example of coercive diplomacy. The 
article notes that U.S. Jewish community leaders rejected Mr. Babacan’s argument and 
noted privately that, “Ankara has only itself to blame for its failure to muster the support 
necessary to derail the resolution.”103 
In light of the recent confrontation at the January 2009 Davos Summit between 
Israeli President Peres and Prime Minister Erdogan, this subject is once again center-
stage. Erdogan’s perceived alignment with Hamas-ruled Gaza in the Israel-Hamas clash 
of January 2009 angered not only Israel but also the American Jewish community. It 
remains to be seen how this interest group will respond when the Armenian community 
and its supporters raise the issue of the tragic events of 1915. Some in the American 
Jewish community perceive Erdogan and Turkey as moving from an “honest broker” in 
the Middle East to that of partisan supporter of Hamas-led Gaza. It remains to be seen if 
the relationship between the Israeli and Turkish security establishments is strong enough 
to overcome this crisis in the relationship, and whether the American Jewish community 
will align with Turkish interests as they have in the past concerning proposed Armenian 
Genocide resolutions, or whether they will simply “sit out” the next round. 
Why does the Turkish government find it necessary to enlist the help of proxies 
within the United States to intercede on their behalf? In other words, why is there no 
effective Turkish lobby in the United States? One disadvantage facing Turkey is that the 
Armenian and Greek communities organize around their respective national churches. 
The Armenian Church and the Greek Orthodox Church in America are focal points and 
support networks for the immigrant communities as well as future generations. 
Conversely, Turkish immigrants have a different relationship with the mosque. Secular, 
self-described “modern” Turks rarely attend mosque, while the nature of the Muslim 
community in America is one of the transcendence of Muslim identity over national 
identities. In other words, many Turkish immigrants simply do not attend mosque with 
                                                 




any frequency, and those who do, develop a more universal identity based on 
nationalism. Without the rallying point of the church, the Turkish community is less 
organized and less able to harness their collective strength than the Greek and Armenian 
communities. 
What actions on Ankara’s part could have led to this confrontation? The article 
mentions lingering American resentment over Turkey’s refusal to approve the use of its 
territory for use in the land invasion of Iraq in 2003. America offered Turkey over $20 
billion in aid for the use of Turkey’s Northern border (a very real positive incentive), yet 
Turkey refused. Turkey’s refusal can be seen as a form of deterrence; attempting to halt 
an action, it disapproved of the invasion of Iraq. This deterrence clearly failed. Hence, the 
Armenian Genocide Resolution (or AGR) can be seen as a form of tit for tat by elements 
of the United States government for previous actions by Turkey.  
The article mentions that in 2006, Turkey hosted Hamas leader Khaled Mashal, 
which angered many of Israel’s supporters on Capitol Hill “who have been among 
Turkey’s most vocal proponents as part of a strategy of developing strong ties between 
Turkey and Israel.”104 If this is to be believed, then it is another example of tit for tat and 
deterrence: expressing displeasure for the Hamas visit and possibly deterring a follow-up 
meeting with Hamas. The article quotes an official from an American Jewish 
organization as stating, “The Hamas thing was really serious. There is less sympathy for 
Turkey because of what some see as an anti-American, anti-Israel, anti-Jewish policy that 
is there.”105 Turkey sees the failure of its Jewish-American supporters to neutralize the 
Armenian issue effectively in Washington as the Jewish community conspiring against it; 
this appears more an example of signaling that the protection that the Jewish 
organizations provide Turkey against hostile Congressional legislation is not automatic. 
Again, this scenario may play out again in light of Prime Minister Erdogan’s perceived 
partisanship for Hamas in the 2008-2009 conflict between Israel and Hamas in Gaza. 
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Yet, there were other reasons that the AGR failed. Turkey was able to coerce the 
United States because Turkey has valuable political goods (airspace, airbases) that 
America desperately needs for its Iraq and Afghanistan operations. However, unlike its 
situation with America, Turkey wants to enter the European Union and has far fewer 
cards to play against Europe. While one can debate Europe’s somewhat spotty record on 
acknowledging past misdeeds, the fact is that Europe holds the keys to EU integration 
and Turkey is the applicant. Brinksmanship on the AGR issue, while perhaps important 
for other aspects of Turkish policy, does not serve its aims of EU integration. 
Again, the Armenian issue not only concerns conflicting narrative of 90-year-old 
events, but also modern nations. Modern Armenia is Turkey’s neighbor in the Caucasus, 
a region that Turkey sees as vital to its interests. Additionally, the prospects on this front 
are better. The political battle between the Armenian Diaspora and Turkey on the 
diplomatic front contrasts with the situation between Turkey and Armenia: two countries 
that actually have to live next to one another and thus find a modus Vivendi.  
After the breakup of the Soviet Union, Turkey sought to increase its influence in 
the former Soviet Caucasus, especially in Azerbaijan, and in Central Asia.106 As nations 
populated by Turkic peoples, these countries have religious, ethnic, and linguistic ties 
with Turkey. This outreach by Turkey actually angered Russia, which countered with 
support to Armenia in its war with Azerbaijan, support to anti-government guerrillas in 
Azerbaijan, and the threat of nuclear force if Turkey intervened physically in the Azeri-
Armenian war.107 Again, this foreign outreach and effort to project influence was a 
marked departure from the inward-looking non-interventionism of the early republic. In 
light of this confrontation with Russia on this issue, NATO’s Partnership for Peace’s 
importance to Turkey becomes more evident. By avoiding a unilateral confrontation and 




                                                 
106 Yost, NATO Transformed the Alliance's New Roles in International Security, 86. 
107 Ibid. 
 42
Peace allows it to extend its influence eastward under the auspices and protection of 
NATO. Since 1992, Turkey has served as Azerbaijan’s “point of contact within 
NATO.108 
While Turkey and Europe clash on the subject of the Armenian Tragedy of World 
War I, Turkish forces and Armenian forces now serve together; thus, forging informal 
civil-military ties. Seventy Armenian soldiers serve with 537 Turkish soldiers on 
Kosovo’s KFOR mission.109 Clearly, KFOR represents an arena where such adversaries 
as Turkey/Azerbaijan and Armenia can work together and perhaps even improve bilateral 
relations, which is also in the national interests of the United States. What is also 
interesting is that Turkey did not exercise its ability to block NATO cooperation with 
Armenia. NATO cooperates with Armenia through the Partnership for Peace Program 
(Armenia joined in 1994), in such areas as defense, rule of law, counter-terrorism and the 
fight against corruption.110 This fits with the U.S. assessment of Turkey’s intentions, 
which is that Turkey seeks some contacts with Armenia,111 despite past disputes and 
controversies. In addition, the President of Turkey recently visited Armenia for a sporting 
event. 
While Turkey and Europe differ on the question of the Armenian tragedy of 
World War I, Turkey clearly wants to improve relations with Armenia. Better relations 
with Armenia would possibly improve Turkey in the eyes of Europe in terms of the issue 
of the Armenian tragedy of World War I and perhaps ease the way for European 
integration. In addition, a Turkey at peace with Armenia could mitigate diplomatic efforts 
overseas concerning the AGR and its equivalent in Europe. 
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IV. TURKEY’S ROLE IN NATO AND ESDP 
A. MULTI-NATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS  
As the ability to work together with Armenian and Azerbaijani forces shows, 
working within a multinational framework can advance Turkey’s interests. Why are 
multinational organizations, particularly NATO, important to Turkey’s EU integration 
process? NATO allows Turkey to “put its best foot forward.” Specifically, Turkey’s 
NATO membership showcases its military prowess, its value as a bridge between East 
and West, and a generally cooperative side to Turkish foreign policy: Turkey as a team 
player.  
One such example of this concept is that Turkey gained a significant amount of 
prestige in its hosting of the 2004 Istanbul Summit. Turkey’s unique geo-political status 
played a major role in its selection for the Summit. In the Istanbul Summit communiqué, 
NATO stated, “Here in Istanbul, a city that bridges two continents, we have reaffirmed 
the vital transatlantic link, and extended new offers of cooperation to countries and to 
regions of strategic importance.”112 One of the key outcomes of the Summit was 
NATO’s decision to elevate the Mediterranean Dialogue to a “genuine partnership,” and 
to launch the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative.113 One of the positive outcomes of the 
summit was the creation of regional liaison offices for the Caucasus (located in Georgia) 
and Central Asia (located in Uzbekistan).114 While Turkey’s involvement with NATO is 
a key enabler to its eastern outreach, it is also true that through NATO, Turkey can 
influence its eastern neighbors in ways that it was unable to do when it acted unilaterally. 
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Turkey’s value to Europe as a bridge can be seen in the NATO Mediterranean 
Dialogue that began in 1994. The Mediterranean Dialogue’s goal is to promote regional 
security and stability, to include border security, combating terror, and defense reform.115 
Interestingly, through the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative and the Mediterranean 
Dialogue, NATO maintains ties with both Israel and the Palestinian Authority, while 
plainly stating that NATO is not a party to the Peace Process.116 Enhancing NATO’s role 
in Mid-East outreach is Turkey’s role as a party trusted by both sides in the Israeli- 
Palestinian conflict. Turkey signed a major military agreement with Israel in 1996, yet 
also maintains ties with Syria, Hamas, and Iran. Europe clearly wants a role in the Middle 
East peace process, but at a fundamental level, for reasons of history and policy, Israel 
does not trust the leading nations of Europe. A Turkey integrated into Europe would 
provide access for Europe and allow it a greater role in the Peace Process. Additionally, 
NATO enlargement is another important topic that the summer 2008 Georgia crisis 
illuminated. In terms of NATO enlargement, Turkey seeks a quid pro quo for its approval 
of new members. Turkey seeks to link its approval of new members to its entry into the 
European Union, or at least some sort of other compensation for its approval.117 This 
reinforces the notion that NATO is a bargaining chip and a form of leverage that Turkey 
uses to advance its EU prospects.  
Yet, Turkey is not just a partner to European security institutions for outreach and 
diplomacy. Rather, its large armed forces contributed to numerous European securities 
institution-led operations over the last ten years. Actually, one of the earlier operations 
was not actually a European security institution-led operation, but collaboration led by 
Italy. Turkey volunteered to join Operation Alba, the multi-national protection force for 
Albania in 1997. It was an Italian-led mission due to the inability to get consensus to 
make it a NATO or WEU mission.118 Turkey contributed 760 troops to this mission. 
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Through Operation Alba, Turkey enhanced its reputation as a willing partner with 
European security institutions. Due to the inability of official European security 
institutions to execute the mission, Italy had to form an ad-hoc “coalition of the 
willing.”119 Thus, Turkey was part of the solution, even when such nations as the United 
States, Britain, and Germany refused to participate.120 Turkey showed Europeans that its 
contributions could be useful, and also, necessary, especially when other nations cannot 
or will not participate. “Turkey could give EU defense plans real muscle, and provide 
much-needed boots on the ground for peacekeeping missions around the globe.”121 
B. TURKEY’S PARTICIPATION IN EU OPERATIONS: OPERATION 
CONCORDIA AND PROXIMAL  
Although not a member of the European Union, Turkey participated in multiple 
European Union-led security operations. In fact, Turkey is the most active non-member 
in ESDP operations, and contributes more than many EU members. Two such operations 
were Concordia and Proxima in FYROM. Operation Proxima lasted from December 
2003 through December 2005. Turkey’s participation was as that of an EU candidate 
nation, along with Bulgaria and Romania122 (which have since earned entry to the EU). 
The goals of the Proxima mission were the strengthening of the rule of law, fighting 
organized crime, and helping to build up local law enforcement capabilities.123 
Turkey’s participation in these operations clearly fits into Turkey’s goals in terms 
of EU membership. However, it also has the added benefit of providing reassurance to 
the Turkish minority of FYROM that a strong and engaged Turkish military operates in 
the Balkans. In addition, a stable Balkans is in the best interests of Turkey strategically. 
Finally, it can also be stated that a peaceful, stable FYROM ensures a more stable life for 
the Turkish minority of FYROM.  
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While Turkey supports a more stable FYROM, others plot against it. One such 
example is the attempts by foreign Islamists to recruit from the Muslim minorities of 
Macedonia. According to Jane’s Defense Daily (April 29, 2008), the majority of this 
recruitment is targeted against the much larger Albanian minority (25% of the 
population), but the ethnic Turks are also targeted. Clearly, if this trend persists, Turkey’s 
support will prove crucial to the government of FYROM. It is not in the interest of 
secular Turkey to see an Islamicized FYROM. Turkey also has influence not only with 
the Turkish minority, but also as noted above, has ties with Albania. Ethnic Turks may be 
less vulnerable to Islamist outreach because Turks are seen as more loyal and more fully 
integrated into society than the larger Albanian population.124 In fact, FYROM’s 
constitution promises full equality as citizens for “Albanians, Turks, and other 
nationalities.”125 Fortunately, 90% of ethnic Turks regard themselves as equal citizens, 
and only 10% feel discriminated against.126 
The 2003 Operation Concordia was a stability operation in FYROM that utilized 
NATO assets already in place. “The operation contributed to the efforts to achieve a 
peaceful, democratic, and prosperous country, as part of a region of stable countries, 
where an international security presence is no longer needed.”127 
C. TURKEY’S PARTICIPATION IN EU OPERATIONS: EUFOR ALTHEA 
(BOSNIA)  
Turkey then engaged with the European Union in support of its security 
operations in Bosnia. Operation Althea began in December 2004 and continues to the 
present. Althea began after the conclusion of NATO’s SFOR operation and the UN 
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Security Council’s authorization of an EU force in Bosnia-Herzegovina.128 The force 
consists of 2,500 troops, including a multi-national maneuver battalion. Turkey’s 
personnel comprise part of this battalion located at Camp Butnir in Sarajevo, and Turkey 
is one of five non-EU countries participating.129 The goal of EUFOR Althea is to 
maintain a safe and secure environment, support local authorities, and support the EU 
special representative.130 Showing the increased interoperability of NATO and EU 
security forces, this operation utilizes in-place NATO assets in accordance with the 
“Berlin Plus” Agreement.131  
D. TURKEY’S PARTICIPATION IN EU OPERATIONS:  EU POLICE 
MISSION IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA  
Turkey does not limit its participation to the EU’s military operations, but also 
joins in civil law enforcement operations. The EU Police Mission in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina began in January 2003 and operates to the present day. Its goal is to 
establish “a sustainable, professional, and multiethnic police service operating in 
accordance with best European and international standards.”132 In the spring of 2008, 
Turkey’s contribution was nine police officers. 
E. TURKEY’S PARTICIPATION IN EU OPERATIONS:  EUFOR RD 
CONGO 
In line with a newfound increase in Turkey’s willingness to project influence 
beyond its immediate neighborhood, Turkey contributed to EU stability operations in the 
police mission of the European Union’s mission to the former Congo. “The European 
Union conducted a European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) police mission in 
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Kinshasa, Democratic Republic of Congo, from April 2005 to June 2007.”133 Turkey, as 
one of two invited non-EU nations, contributed to the team.134 The team served as 
monitors and advisors to a newly formed Congolese police, and helped ensure a 
successful Congolese election in July of 2006.135 In listing Turkey’s contribution to the 
mission, the EUPOL-Kinshasa mission’s press release noted that Turkey is a candidate 
for EU membership. In this light, Turkey’s participation in this exercise can again be seen 
as advancing its national interests through cooperation and outreach. 
F. TURKEY’S PARTICIPATION IN AFGHANISTAN: THE 
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ASSISTANCE FORCE 
Afghanistan has been another arena where Turkey shows its use, and thus, 
improves its EU integration prospects. As of January 2008, ISAF consisted of over 
49,000 troops from 26 NATO and 14 non-NATO countries. ISAF’s key issues consist of 
the following: Security and Reconstruction, Afghan capacity, Counter-Narcotics, 
Insurgent activity, and Pakistan.136 Turkey has 625 troops, located in the Kabul and 
Wardak provinces.137 In addition, Turkey is the Provincial Reconstruction Team lead for 
the Wardak Province.138 Turkey is the 12th largest contributor of the 40 nations to ISAF. 
For a nation with such sizable armed forces, why such a relatively small contribution? 
One factor is that due to the ongoing Kurdish insurgency, the military is very active at 
home. Any deployment outside the country is subject to internal political pressure 
because of this fact. Fortunately, Turkey has lost no troops in Afghanistan since 2001.139 
Some NATO countries commit forces to a NATO operation, and then place restrictions 
called “national caveats.” At the Riga Summit in November 2006, NATO leaders tried to 
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reduce the number of such caveats.140 The French government reduced its caveats and 
agreed to allow its forces in Kabul and elsewhere to come to the assistance of other 
NATO forces in an emergency. Turkey, in contrast, refused to change its proscription 
against its forces’ use in combat.141 This situation has a somewhat mixed message 
concerning EU integration. While Turkey can contribute more than it does currently, it is 
in good company within Europe in this respect. Overall, Turkey’s involvement in ISAF 
shows it to be a team player, and thus, improves its EU accession chances.  
As a Muslim nation, Turkey adds legitimacy to ISAF’s mission in Afghanistan. 
Its mere participation means that a Christian force does not occupy Afghanistan, but 
rather, a force comprised of different faiths and different nations. Just as the support of 
the Arabs in World War I allowed the Allies to avoid the stigma of a war on the Muslim 
world, the support of Turkey can help NATO avoid the same stigma in 2009. This 
stresses the theme that Turkey can serve as a bridge for Europe, and thus, improves 
Turkey’s integration prospects. 
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V. CHALLENGES AND CONCLUSION  
A. TURKEY’S PARTICIPATION IN EU OPERATIONS: CHALLENGES  
Despite the multiple above-mentioned success stories, Turkey’s involvement with 
European security institutions suffers from obvious problems. Turkey’s dispute with 
Cyprus manifested itself in March 2008 in a dispute over security cooperation in Kosovo. 
An article on Turkey’s role in Kosovo (Turkish Daily News, March 4, 2008), noted that 
Turkey used its veto right within NATO to block access by European Union security 
forces to NATO assets located in Kosovo. The dispute stemmed from Cyprus’s 
participation in the EU’s Kosovo security partnership. The article also noted that this 
dispute placed Turkey at odds with both the European Union and NATO. Further, it 
created an internal split between the Turkish military (in favor of a veto) and the Turkish 
civilian government (against utilizing the veto). This incident obscures the fact that 
Turkey played a positive role in Kosovo to this point. 
Why is Cyprus such a contentious issue for Turkey? Throughout the 1950s and 
1960s, the Greek and Turkish communities engaged in violent clashes with one another. 
In 1974, after Greek Cypriots staged a coup to unite Cyprus with Greece, Turkey invaded 
Cyprus. Turkish troops occupied much of the island, and Turkish troops remain there 
today. Turkey does not recognize Cyprus as the representative of the entire island of 
Cyprus. Rather, it refers to Southern Cyprus as the “Greek Cypriot Administration” while 
recognizing Northern Cyprus as the “Turkish Republic of North Cyprus.” In fact, 
according to the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “the Greek Cypriots have no 
authority to represent the whole of Cyprus or the Turkish Cypriots.”142 
In response to the 1974 invasion, the United States imposed an arms embargo on 
Turkey on February 5, 1975. The United States performed this action do demonstrate its 
displeasure with Turkey’s actions, and to coerce Turkey into reversing its actions. Yet 
Turkey did not react in the way the United States anticipated. According to the Spring 
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2004 edition of “Perceptions,” the official publication of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, “the nearly four-year long embargo period cast a dark shadow on the then 
already fragile alliance, and created, especially in the eyes of the Turkish public, a deep 
lack of confidence towards the United States.”143  
Turkey then reacted by closing all United States bases in its country except for 
one. Turkey’s reaction can be seen as coercive: it did not like the embargo and wished for 
the United States to reverse its position. It is also an example of tit for tat. Turkey 
perceived negative behavior on the part of the United States and reacted in kind. 
Interestingly, the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs is also aware of the coercive nature 
of the 1974 Turkish-U.S. crisis over Cyprus. The article notes, “Above all, an embargo is 
a coercive economic measure. What makes it unique in this case is its imposition as a 
punishment on an allied country. Secondly, it is an appropriate example to analyze [sic] 
the role of ethnic lobbies on foreign policy.”144  
This statement showcases several points. First, it shows Turkey’s bruised feelings 
as a “uniquely punished allied country.”145 It also shows that Turkey suspects ethnic 
lobbies in the United States of having undue coercive influence; in this case, the Greek 
Lobby. Turkey felt that the Greek Lobby rallied to the cause of Greece and Cyprus and 
forced the embargo through Congress. Yet in the end, America’s coercive action failed. 
In 1978, America ended the embargo: Turkey’s support in the Cold War was too 
valuable. There are Turkish troops in Northern Cyprus to this day. 
The Cyprus issue even affects the communications between the NATO alliance 
and the EU. In terms of communication between NATO and the European Union, the 
main conduit is a bi-monthly meeting of NATO-COPS (COPS is the Political and 
Security Committee of the European Union).146 However, Turkey “refuses to allow 
discussion of more substantial Alliance business in the presence of countries-Cyprus and 
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Malta-which are members of neither NATO nor the Partnership for Peace.”147 In 
addition, Turkey blocks the transfer of intelligence material from NATO to the European 
Union because the intelligence would then be accessible by Cyprus. This can only be 
overcome by an EU guarantee that the material will not be shared with Cyprus or 
Malta.148 This is clearly an example of one of Turkey’s troubled relationships hampering 
the effectiveness of a European security institution. Former EU Ambassador to Turkey 
Michael Lake summarizes the problem succinctly: How does the continuing Cyprus 
conflict affect Turkey’s relations with the EU and with NATO? The answer is: ‘pretty 
badly.’ The bottom line is that the entire Cyprus issue works against Turkey’s EU 
integration goals. 
Yet, there is reason for optimism in terms of the Cyprus issue. In 2004, Prime 
Minister Erdogan overruled the opinions of the military establishment and argued for the 
Turkish Cypriot community to vote for the United Nations re-unification plan. Not only 
did this move show pragmatism on the part of Turkey, but it also may be a turning point 
in Turkish civil-military relations in terms of a military subordinate to elected civilian 
leadership.149 
While the Cyprus issue is problematic to Turkey and its goals concerning Europe, 
the situation for Turkey in the Balkans is more nuanced. As mentioned above, the 
Balkans is an important issue for Turkey that will be on the agenda of the Bucharest 
Summit. What are Turkey’s goals on this front? According to the Turkish Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, Turkey sees securing peace and stability in the Balkans as one of 
Turkey’s foreign policy priorities, yet at the same time, states a wish to improve relations 
with Serbia. Turkey’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs notes the long historical ties between 
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The Ministry also notes that, “Turkey has always supported the efforts of Macedonia to 
complete its Euro-Atlantic integration. Turkey is determined to continue its support to 
this end.”150 
Yet Turkey’s support, through participation in security institutions, of an 
independent Kosovo can also be seen through the lens of its historic rivalry with Greece, 
and to a lesser extent, Russia. Greece, as well as Russia, supported Serbia as a fellow 
Orthodox nation. Kosovo’s independence is seen as a blow to Serbian pride and 
ambitions. In this context, by supporting Kosovo’s independence, Turkey can tweak its 
rivals Greece and Russia by proxy. Yet, this is just another example of Turkey’s rivalries 
getting in the way of its goals. Just like the “FYROM issue,” Turkey antagonizes Greece 
to its own detriment. Greece has the ability to hamper EU integration for Turkey. 
B. TURKEY’S ROLE IN THE BALKANS 
While the Balkans are a part of Europe, for four hundred years, they were a part 
of the Ottoman Empire. Again, this past reverberates in modern Turkish culture and even 
in the demographic makeup of modern Turkey. The Ottoman Empire’s retreat from the 
Balkans changed the ethnic composition both of the Balkans and what is now modern 
Turkey. Yet, it also propelled the process from the Ottoman Empire to the future Turkish 
Republic. Millions of Muslims joined the Ottomans in their retreat from the Balkans. 
This demographic upset changed the character of the Ottoman Empire and transformed 
the Ottoman Empire “from a broadly tolerant multi-ethnic empire into a Nineteenth 
Century nationalistic state.”151 
As noted above, the rise of nationalism in Western Europe, specifically in France, 
accelerated the decline of the Ottoman Empire in the Balkans by introducing new ideas 
dangerous to the status quo. In the Balkans, the existing institutions, customs, biases, and 
superstitions were more or less frozen in place until the early to mid nineteenth 
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century.”152 However, it must be mentioned that Western Europe influenced Eastern 
Europe in other ways as well. Eastern Europe also learned of the changes taking place 
through the invasions of Napoleon,153 and his export of the new ideas of France to the 
east. 
The rise of Greek nationalism in the 1800s was an early step in this process and 
part of a larger process described by Carl Schmitt, who believed that the European 
system in place at the time of the Ottoman Empire’s destruction and the rise of modern 
Turkey (the 1920s) system “can only be understood as the consequence of the last 
centuries of European development.”154 Just as Modern Europe is a product of the 
evolutionary process from the 17th century to the present, so too is modern Turkey a 
product of these past events. 
This chapter spends a great deal of time exploring Turkey’s involvement in the 
Balkans, so it is important to ask: Why are the Balkans so important to Turkey’s current 
involvement in European security institutions? The answer has much to do with history. 
With the gradual dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, many of its Muslim subjects 
retreated with the Ottoman Empire towards modern Turkey. In fact, there are 
neighborhoods in modern Istanbul named Yeni Bosna (New Bosnia) and Arnavutkoy 
(Village of the Albanians). However, some Muslims stayed behind. There remains a 
Turkish minority in Bulgaria and FYROM, as well as non-Turkish Muslims to include 
Bosniaks and Albanians. Turkey seeks a continued relation with these peoples and has 
sought out opportunities to assist these populations. 
One example of Turkey’s continued ties in the Balkans is its close relationship 
with Albania. Turkey currently assists Albania with the restructuring of its military, to 
include the reconstruction of Albanian naval bases.155 Turkey also assists Albania with 
professional military education, military health care, technical and logistical 
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assistance.156 A large Albanian expatriate community in Turkey as well as the 
abovementioned fact that many modern Turks trace their family history back to families 
that fled Albania with the end of Ottoman control augment Turkey’s ties with Albania. 
The United States acknowledges the importance of the Balkans to Turkey. In fact, 
a key concern of the United States is that fighting in the Balkans could pull in other 
countries, to include Albania, Greece, and Turkey.157 
What is the Turkish security establishment’s view on participation in European 
security institutions? Additionally, what relationship with Europe does Turkey’s 
establishment seek? Turkey views its contribution as valuable to the European Union. A 
Turkish officer completing a thesis through the United States military noted that Turkey’s 
positive role in the Balkans, Eurasia, and the Middle East underlines its importance to the 
European Union.158 Additionally, the thesis notes that, “For Turkey, acceptance of its 
candidacy is a natural response to the sacrifices it made throughout the Cold War period. 
As the only NATO member with a land border with the Soviet Union, it bore a heavy 
share of the Alliance’s burden. It finds it fitting that, having contributed to the creation of 
the new Europe; it should also be part of this Europe.”159 In other words, Europe owes 
Turkey and a just reward would be entry into the EU. Six years elapsed since this thesis, 
in which time, Romania and Bulgaria gained acceptance while Turkey did not. Thus, this 
is at best a dream deferred. However, Turkey’s participation in European security 
institutions clearly fits into Turkey’s goals and interests. By participating in these 
institutions, both NATO and EU, Turkey is building up credit, and at some point, it 
expects to be repaid. Europe’s rewarding of good behavior on the part of the EU 
candidates is not new. In the 1990s, Bulgaria and Romania “were rewarded” for support 
of the NATO Kosovo operation.160  
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Another important point to Turkey’s involvement with European security 
institutions is that Turkey’s current foreign policy is perceived as closer to European 
policies than it is to current U.S. strategy, especially concerning the U.S. approach to Iraq 
in 2003 and the current confrontation with Iran. Turkey does not favor the confrontational 
strategy adopted by the United States, but instead, favors the European strategy of 
dialogue. Another example of Turkey’s tilt toward Europe is Turkey’s commitment to the 
Airbus A400 military transport developed by Europe, along with Belgium, France, 
Germany, Luxembourg, Spain, and the United Kingdom. Even though using American 
C-130 or C-17 airlift would be less expensive and faster to procure, “European defense 
industries create European jobs.”161 Hence, Turkey placed more weight on the European 
relationship in this case than the American relationship. Clearly, Turkey is making efforts 
at European integration. 
Yet, the security institutions also reflect the divide between Europe and Turkey. 
This can be found in the run-up to the 2003 Iraq war. A contemporary article from PBS 
illustrates this crisis 162 At the time, the United States planned to enter Northern Iraq via 
Turkey. NATO attempted to deploy anti-missile and anti-chemical defenses to Turkey, in 
anticipation of possible Iraqi attacks. However, NATO members Belgium, France, and 
Germany opposed this move. This can be seen as a form of deterrence on the part of 
Germany and France: trying to stop an imminent action (invasion of Iraq) by opposing 
NATO support for Turkey in the event of an attack. While Turkey’s decision not to open 
up its territory to the anti-Iraq coalition made this a moot point in the end, it highlighted 
strains in the alliance. 
Another example of Turkey’s tilt toward Europe is the re-accession of France to 
NATO. According to Agence France-Presse, “Turkey will not block France’s return to 
NATO command, despite French objections to Ankara’s European Union integration.”163 
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The article quoted the Turkish Justice Minister: “We do not find it ethical or suitable to 
link the EU process with any other issue,” and “Our Expectation from the French 
presidency is to continue our membership negotiations in transparency are in line with 
the principle that agreements must be kept.”164 The article noted President Sarkozy’s role 
as an opponent of Turkey’s accession. Again, Turkey tempers its actions inside of NATO 
to improve its chances of EU accession.  
C. CIVIL SOCIETY 
Much of what Europe demands of Turkey actually runs counter to the desires of 
the Turkish people. The EU wants a weakening of the military, yet the military is 
Turkey’s most trusted institution. During Ottoman times, soldiering was considered part 
of Turkishness. This is one concept that continues to the present day. Even today, the 
concept of soldiering is equated with Turkishness. One popular marching cadence heard 
on Turkish military bases is “Her-Turk-Asker-Dogar,” or “Every Turk is born a Soldier.” 
In this sense, the strong role of the military in Turkish society is not a new concept. Even 
today’s Turkish military uses words and concepts directly from its Ottoman tradition. 
Turkish soldiers are called “Mehmetcik” or “Soldiers of Mohammed. In earlier 
Republican Turkey, the military was still nicknamed “Peygenberin Ocagi,” or “The 
Prophet’s Heart.” Wounded soldiers are called “Gazi,” or fighter for “Islam.” Soldiers 
killed in the line of duty are known as “Sehit,” or “martyr.”165 The current issue of Jane’s 
Defense shows a young Turkish conscript, serving in Southeast Turkey, scribbling graffiti 
on a soon to be used artillery shells. The graffiti reads “Sehitler Olmez,” or “Martyrs 
never die.” Just as soldiering was considered equivalent with Turkishness, a career as a 
military man was a source of pride. “A military career was one of the most prestigious 
professions in the state, and the Janissary tradition of being a force unto itself, above 
society, and even above the direct control of the State’s bureaucratic apparatus, was a 
tradition that continued into the Ottoman period.”166 This concept of a military career as 
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a source of pride and prestige continues to this day. Entrance into the military service 
academies is extremely competitive. Soldiers are highly respected in society. 
The Turkish military as a society apart works against Turkey’s integration. This 
can be seen in Turkish society today. While American officers are somewhat isolated 
from society by a unique code of conduct, lifestyle, and by the closed nature of military 
bases, today’s Turkish military is even more so. As opposed to the United States military, 
where the Service Academies, ROTC, and Officer Candidate Schools each provide 
officers, the Turkish military relies almost entirely on the Service Academies for its 
officer corps. The service academies, in turn, rely on military high schools for its 
enrollees. Therefore, a Turkish officer has been in the military essentially since the age of 
14. This accounts for the greater homogeneity in outlook and beliefs of the Turkish 
officer corps, in contrast to other Western militaries. In addition, while the Turkish 
military is respected by society, their lifestyle is somewhat alien to the youthful, 
cosmopolitan, modern “Istanbul” society. The concept of an insular military culture can 
be debated on its merits, but clearly, it shows a cleavage between Turkey and Europe. 
Today’s Eurocrats are cosmopolitan and less committed to the concept of nationalism. A 
highly nationalistic, insular Turkish military is alien to the European elite. 
The death penalty is another societal cleavage between Turkey and Europe. A 
majority of the Turkish public supports the death penalty.167 Hence, the ruling AK Party 
has a difficult challenge in pursuing EU integration while not upsetting the population. 
It is important to note that the AK Party worked harder than previous 
governments to improve Turkey’s EU membership prospects.168 Why does the AK Party 
pursue this policy? Is it counter-intuitive that an Islam-based party is more enthusiastic 
for European integration than the Kemalists? The AK Party wants to be seen as part of 
the European scene. The legitimization within Europe is an AK Party strategy to gain 
legitimacy in Turkey itself, and thus, work toward its long-term goal of reforming the 
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Turkish political system.169 Islamic groups supported EI accession as a way to control the 
perceived excesses of the secular/military Turkish establishment.170 “The major impact 
of the 1997 coup was the Islamic rediscovery of Europe as a space and an idea to protect 
human rights and the rule of law.”171 What happened? The old cleavages of Turkish 
politics have been completely reversed. The Kemalists, once pro-Western, are now anti-
Western. The Islamists, once anti-Western, now support good relations with the U.S. and 
the EU 
Yet again, the AK Party has serious problems facing it. The AKP, if it depends on 
Europe and the U.S to protect it from the secularist Turkish Establishment, runs the risk 
of appearing dependent on foreign powers, and thus, undermine its popular support.172 It 
also must contend with its rivals in the secular Turkish establishment. Much of what the 
secular establishment supports runs counter to EU practices and beliefs. Since the 
Kemalist forces now view Westernization as a negative force, the Islamist forces (on the 
opposite side of Turkey’s secular-religious cleavage) “Are in the process of rediscovering 
Europe as a positive force and have been defending Turkey’s full integration into the 
EU.”173  
Actually, the Kemalist establishment cleaved after the 1997 coup into pro- and 
anti- EU camps. One camp favored the nation state, while the other sided with 
democratization and Europeanization, with the military siding with the nation state and 
against Europeanization. The Kemalist establishment also views the U.S. and the EU as 
“soft” on the AKP.174 Essentially, Kemalists within Turkey view the AK Party and Prime 
Minister Erdogan in particular as “wolves in sheep’s clothing” and that they are using 
Western values to subvert the secular state. 
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According to Frank Schimmelfennig’s piece, The Impact of EU Political 
Conditionality, Turkey’s Kemalist State Doctrine is Itself, partially based on values alien 
to western liberal democracy and on a wide range of issues, has led to authoritarian 
domestic political practices that conflict with core European norms.175 Schimmelfenning 
goes on to identify the military’s influence over politics, its four coups (1960, 1971, 
1980, and 1997), support for the death penalty, and the restriction of free speech as 
actions that run afoul of European standards.176 He also notes that Turkey utilizes 
military courts that do not meet European standards of independence and fairness.177 
Owing to the painful history of the Ottoman Empire’s breakup and destruction 
(due in large part to the revolts of minorities like the Greeks, Arabs, Armenians, and 
others), the secular elite fears that granting greater minority rights will lead to the 
breakup of Turkey.178 Yet, there has been progress on minority rights, spurred on by a 
desire to join the EU. On October 4, 2001, the Turkish Parliament lifted the ban on using 
“forbidden languages.”179 In August 2002, Parliament authorized broadcasting in 
Kurdish.180 The Kurdish minority supports EU accession. They see the EU as a way to 
guarantee human rights.181  
While Turkey and the EU definitely differ on issues of civil society, the prospect 
of EU accession brought about changes in Turkish society. Expressions of ethnic identity 
are now more possible in Turkey. Again, Turkey altered its policies to facilitate EU 
accession. 
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Actually, when it comes to EU membership, the EU gives Turkey a mixture of 
ambivalence and mixed signals.182 Europe’s leverage over Turkey in terms of EU 
membership suffers from a lack of credibility. Since Turkey has been in candidate status 
for so long, and because many European nations do not believe Turkey will ever meet the 
conditions “for cultural, historical, geographic, and religious reasons,” Europe has lost 
credibility.183 This has effects inside Turkey as well. As the Kemalist elite (those on the 
pro-EU side of the Kemalist cleavage) identifies themselves as Europeans, their rejection 
by Europe is very painful.184 Yet, Turkey has clearly shown its willingness to change to 
meet European standards, when it thought success was in sight. When the EU’s 
credibility increased after the Helsinki Summit, Turkey responded with a greater pace of 
change.185 
Today, Europe continues to delay Turkish integration into the European Union. 
While some of this delay may be for legitimate reasons, there are other reasons as well. 
Three hundred years ago, the Ottomans were at the gates of Vienna, and that is not a 
terribly long time by European standards. Seriously, Europe needs to tell Turkey if it has 
a serious chance of integration. Turkey, on the other hand, must acknowledge that 
Europe’s norms are different and Turkey is the applicant. Thus, if Turkey wishes to join 
the European Union (and Europe is sincere), there is more work to do. Turkey and 
Europe have a lot to offer one another, and a Western-oriented, European Turkey fits well 
within the interests of the United States. 
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